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INTRODUCTION

One of the most common problems in commercial transactions is the resolution of information asymmetries, situations in which one party to the transaction
knows more about a relevant fact than the other party.' The natural response of
the disadvantaged party is to attempt to investigate the transaction for itself-to
investigate the matter with "due diligence"-but often such an investigation
will be expensive and, however diligently undertaken, leave the truth of the
matter uncertain.2 A law-centered approach to the problem would call for the
development of warranties and covenants that the party with superior information would give to the party with inferior information. Such an approach would
rely on lawsuits to prevent and redress any breach of the applicable warranties
and covenants.
For numerous reasons, however, the formal legal system cannot provide a
satisfactory solution to the problem. For one thing, formal legal rules cannot
show the context sensitivity necessary to obtain the correct set of assurances
from parties with superior information. Thus, formal legal rules by themselves
often provide assurances that are either excessive or inadequate in the circumstances of a particular transaction. Similarly, the costs of transacting often make
it impractical for the parties to develop those assurances on their own on a
case-by-case basis. 3 Finally, even if legislators or contracting parties could

1. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REv. 549, 595 n.134 (1984) ("The difficulty of assuring oneself of the value of purchased
information has been recognized for some time.").
2. See, e.g., GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS: THE

PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET: AN OVERVIEW 43-44 (1998) (discussing the role of preinvestment due
diligence in resolving informational sorting problems).
3. This could be true either because the situation is too complicated to justify the cost of agreeing
upon dispositions of all the possible outcomes or because the decisions in question (such as the future
effort of managers) are not verifiable to third parties such as courts. For a thorough analysis, see
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and
LateralIntegration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691,698 (1986).
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devise appropriate assurances, the cost and uncertainty of enforcing those
assurances through legal processes is prohibitive. Accordingly, contracting parties often can provide more effective solutions to information problems through
the use of privately instituted sanctions that operate either partially or wholly
apart from the legal system.4
In that vein, this article works within the tradition of institutional economics
associated with Douglass North. The article starts from the premise that the
success and failure of parties in conducting value-increasing transactions cannot
be explained solely by reference to the mechanics of supply and demand curves.

A crucial part of any account of transactions must analyze the institutional
background against which individual parties contract, because the success and
failure of transacting parties often depends on the effectiveness of those institutions. 5 I have published a series of articles in the last few years that present a
substantial amount of empirical evidence drawn from interviews and case

studies about the transacting practices that businesses follow in a variety of
commercial contexts involving some form of credit or payment.6 Each of those
articles has attempted to provide a localized theoretical explanation for the
behavior that it describes, much of which consists of sophisticated mechanisms
for resolving problems of information asymmetry. This article tries to build

4. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1793-94 (1996) (explaining why contracting
parties might make extralegal commitments to respond to the possibility of untrustworthy behavior by
contract partners); Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 920-921
(1998) (noting that private institutions for solving information problems are useful when legal remedies
are ineffective); Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social
Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 81-90 (1987) (criticizing "legal centralism" and law-and-economics
scholars generally because they "have underappreciated the role that nonlegal systems play in achieving social order"); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 691, 703 (1983) (presenting a model in which "reputation will substitute perfectly for a damage
rule"); Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. Soc.
REV. 55 (1963); Eric Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions
on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 144-65 (1996) (discussing the interaction between the
nonlegal sanctions available to private groups and the legal sanctions imposed by the state); Jane
Kaufman Winn, RelationalPracticesand the Marginalizationof Law: Informal FinancialPracticesof
Small Businesses in Taiwan, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 193, 196-97 (1994) (discussing the marginalization
of law in the Taiwanese business system).
5. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) (providing an overview of Douglass North's approach to economic analysis).
6. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626
(1997) [hereinafter Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit]; Ronald J. Mann, The First Shall Be Last: A
Contextual Argument for Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien Priority, 75 TEx. L.. REV. 11, 27-31
(1996) [hereinafter Mann, Temporal Priority]; Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in
Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. 1, 30-34 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Small-Business Lending];
Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. REv. 951,
984-85 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Searchingfor Negotiability]; Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in
the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159, 221-26 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Strategy and
Force]; see also RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1999)
(textbook presenting the results of a series of interviews and site visits regarding payment systems,
credit systems, and liquidity systems).
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upon those prior articles by providing a unified theoretical framework for those
mechanisms. Specifically, this article contends that all of those mechanisms (as
well as the law-centered mechanisms described above) can be analyzed most
clearly by reference to a single theme, the bond-like transaction described in
Oliver Williamson's seminal paper on the use of hostages in relational contracting.7
The article proceeds in three steps. The first part provides a simple and
relatively abstract model of the hostage or bonding process that I use to analyze
the institutions and mechanisms discussed later in the article. Part I emphasizes
how a one-sided punitive bond arrangement provides a useful solution to the
problem of information asymmetry by enhancing the cost of a breach while
minimizing the bond-holder's incentive for opportunism. It also highlights a
variety of practical problems that limit the circumstances in which that arrangement can be effective.
The second and third parts of the article are more concrete. Part II uses the
model set out in Part I to consider the extent to which the most common devices
for resolving information asymmetries in financing transactions (collateral,
relational contracting, and reputational bonds) in fact rely on the incentives
created by the bonding mechanism. The description emphasizes the apparent
importance of punitive bonding mechanisms to all three devices, but uses the
model to show the limited commercial contexts in which those mechanisms are
effective.
The third part extends that typology to situations in which the two transacting
parties rely on a third party to provide verification of the contested assertions. I
distinguish two separate ways in which the third party can verify the contested
assertions: by a financial commitment of the third party (such as a guaranty), or
by an independent assertion of the third party. That third party's assertion, in
turn, could be obtained through something as simple as word-of-mouth communication, or through a more formal arrangement involving an information
merchant or an information intermediary. Again, the model illuminates the
reasons that those mechanisms are effective (in some contexts) and explains the
problems that limit their effectiveness in other contexts.
The result is a rich picture of a variety of elegant devices for resolving
information asymmetry, many of them functioning without substantial aid from
public enforcement authorities. The ability of private parties to design such
complex and specifically tailored solutions to their problems should give pause
to those who aim to solve all the problems of commercial transactions by
enacting ever more comprehensive statutory rules to govern those transactions.
As suggested above by the analogy to the use of hostages, the devices that I
discuss often contemplate the starkly brutal exercise of leverage by one party

7. Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages To Support Exchange, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. 519 (1983) (explaining how relational contracts rely on hostage-like, transaction-specific
assets).
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against another, but this article shows that such devices nevertheless can reflect
rational choices by the parties that select them to precommit to a specified
course of conduct. Thus, any effort to regulate or prohibit those devices should
be grounded in some other policy: either a concern that the parties did not
understand the devices (imperfect information) or a concern that the devices are
fundamentally unacceptable to society as a whole-even if parties accept them
voluntarily (unconscionability). The raw exercise of power might be disquieting, but, standing alone, that is not sufficient reason to prohibit it.
I. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF INSTITUTIONS FOR VERIFYING INFORMATION

The main purpose of this article is to develop a framework for understanding
the mechanisms that the parties to financing transactions use to resolve information asymmetries. Because the discussion that follows addresses a wide variety
of transactions, it is important at the outset to describe the types of information
problems that I analyze and to explain a few standard terms that I use throughout the article. The discussion in this part is necessarily abstract, even vague,
because its purpose is to provide a general overview of the framework applied
in the latter parts of the article. Thus, if the abstract descriptions in this part
seem unsatisfying in their generality, the problem should be remedied by the
more specific, empirically grounded discussions in the latter parts of the article.
A. THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY

Information asymmetries arise whenever one party to a transaction possesses
superior information. To use a simple example, I might be thinking about
loaning you money, but I am troubled by your superior knowledge of your
reliability (or unreliability) as a borrower. Your self-interest makes it difficult
for us to agree upon the terms of such a transaction because-absent some
device for minimizing the effects of that information problem-I must account
for the possibility that you are a highly unreliable borrower, which would lead
me to propose onerous lending conditions. Conversely, you might know yourself to be a highly reliable borrower, most unlikely to default, and thus think it
appropriate to borrow money on highly favorable terms.
Although my analysis aims to cover a broad range of transactions, my focus
(like the focus of most of my prior work) is on transactions that involve the
financing of business operations. Accordingly, for convenience I refer throughout the article to the parties struggling with an information asymmetry by terms
that reflect that basic transaction. Thus, I generally refer to the party with
inferior information-the party trying to evaluate the information-as the
"lender" and the party with superior information-the party seeking to per8
suade the lender that it is reliable-as the "borrower."

8. It is possible that the lender occasionally will have superior information and the borrower will
have inferior information, perhaps because the borrower is unduly optimistic and the lender has
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Before moving on to discuss the devices that businesses use to resolve
information asymmetries, it is important to distinguish two distinct contexts in
which the borrower can have superior knowledge. One context involves assertions of historical facts as to which the borrower is more likely to have accurate
knowledge than the lender: Do this company's financial statement and prospectus accurately present the current state of its operations? Was this building
constructed in a first-class manner? Is this person authorized to bind the
company to repay the proposed loan? For convenience, I refer to that type of
information as a fact or a factual assertion. A second context involves information about the borrower's future conduct. The accuracy of any assertion about
such conduct cannot be known presently by either party, although the eventual
accuracy might be wholly or partially within the control of the borrower. That
type of information is particularly important-indeed, central-to credit transactions or other long-term relational arrangements: Will you repay a loan in a
timely manner as the payments come due in the future? Will you shirk in your
future performance? For convenience, I refer to that type of information as a
forecast. 9
Those two types of information are not entirely distinct. Information about
historical facts often sheds light on the plausibility of forecasts about future
conduct. For example, information about the current financial position and past
repayment practices of a borrower may be quite predictive (in the statistical
1°
sense) of the likelihood that the borrower will repay a proposed loan. But the
distinction is important because forecasts raise a moral hazard problem' about
future conduct that is not present in the assertion context. Nevertheless, because
the borrower's relation to the two types of information is quite different,
transactional arrangements that resolve those problems necessarily function
differently in some ways. With respect to assertions, the effect of the arrangement is contemporaneous with the assertion; it enhances the incentive of the
borrower to make an assertion that is truthful at that moment. With respect to
forecasts, on the other hand, the arrangement has a continuous effect, enhancing
the incentive of the borrower at each moment during the term of the arrangement (until the funds are entirely repaid) to act in a way that minimizes the risk
that the borrower will not be able to perform as agreed. The point of this article,

superior expertise at evaluating the project in question. My impression, however, is that such an
occurrence is so uncommon that it does not form an organizing feature of the transactions in question.
9. For a similar dichotomy between facts and forecasts, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at
561-63. The distinction is also similar to the line that Alan Schwartz draws between contractible and
noncontractible information. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and JudicialStrategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 280 (1992); see also Grossman
& Hart, supra note 3, at 698-99, 710-13 (earlier use of a similar distinction).
10. See, e.g., Mann, Small-Business Lending, supra note 6, at 30-34 (discussing how credit-scoring
systems rely on a small number of facts to identify borrowers likely to repay proposed loans).
11. For the benefit of readers unfamiliar with the term, "moral hazard" describes the problem that
arises when one party has an excessive incentive to engage in risky activity because another party will
bear any loss from that activity.
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however, is that notwithstanding those differences, parties seem to use structurally similar devices to respond to the two kinds of problems. Hence, a joint
analysis of the two kinds of problems produces a more thorough understanding
of those devices.
B. SOLVING THE PROBLEM: VERIFYING INFORMATION WITH BONDS

One important goal of this article is to consider the extent to which the
traditional mechanisms with which businesses respond to information asymmetries can be explained as relying on the classic hostage or bonding arrangement.
Of course, businesses sometimes solve informational asymmetries by using
related devices that operate without the posting of a bond.' 2 In the financing
context, however, parties generally respond to such asymmetries with a range of
more or less successful bonding devices. 13
The basic structure of a bonding device is simple. First, the borrower posts
some sort of asset that functions as a hostage, or bond, 14 to verify the truth of
the information that the borrower asserts.15 Then, if the information turns out to
be false-if the borrower fails to make a promised payment, if the borrower's
net worth falls below a stated level, if the building was not constructed as
represented-the lender is entitled to execute on the bond. 16

12. For example, it is easy to identify simple screening devices in contexts that involve factual
assertions. Consider the use of a life-insurance policy that pays nothing if the insured dies within three
years of issuance: that term functions to screen out potential insureds that believe that they have an
elevated chance of death in the ensuing three years. It is beyond the scope of this article to explain why
businesses do not always use bonding devices in those other contexts. As the method of explication
developed here suggests, any explanation of that problem would require a detailed understanding of the
institutional dynamics of those contexts. I limit this article to the context in which I feel capable of
providing that understanding.
13. This article's focus on the dynamics that allow the bonding device to operate successfully
distinguishes it from Stephen Choi's recent article on gatekeepers. See Choi, supra note 4. His article
provides a detailed analysis of how imperfect competition limits the potential for an optimal gatekeeper
regime. In contrast to this article, Professor Choi's article for the most part implicitly accepts the
theoretical efficacy of reputational bonding and focuses instead on the difficulties of ensuring that such
a system works well in an imperfectly competitive certification market. See id. at 939-49 (discussing
the problems with the certification market and defects in traditional methods of legal intervention in
that market); see also id. at 949-62 (analyzing several possible legal responses to defects in the
certification market).
14. The hostage metaphor is, of course, Oliver Williamson's. See Williamson, supra note 7, at
519-20. In this article, I use the "bond" metaphor instead, largely because of concerns about the
inaccurate implications of references to the hostage transaction. As my colleague Bill Miller has
pointed out to me, the voluntarily given hostage traditionally agreed to provide active service to the
party holding the hostage; that is quite different from the transactions I discuss, in which any benefit
from use of the bond ordinarily accrues for the benefit of the party posting the bond, not the party
holding it.
15. For a brief earlier effort to generalize Williamson's analysis, see David Charny, Nonlegal
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REV. 373, 392-99 (1990) (suggesting that
bond-like institutions can be used to resolve problems of information asymmetry).
16. In most contexts, the parties would agree that the lender could execute on the bond whenever the
assertion or forecast was false, without regard to the state of mind of the borrower in making the false
statement. Thus, for example, a borrower could not prevent foreclosure for failure to pay by claiming
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It is useful to view the bonding mechanism as providing an additional piece
of information to the lender about the information that the borrower has asserted
directly. That new piece of information (which I call second-order information)
can help the lender determine the reliability of the borrower's underlying
assertion (the first-order information). If the second-order information is generated in a way that makes it more reliable than the first-order information, then
the second-order information can enhance the borrower's ability to prove the
reliability of its assertions to the lender.
Of course, second-order information is not more reliable simply because it
comes from a source other than the assertion of the borrower. Thus, that
information does not necessarily solve the lender's problem. Rather, it moves
the problem to another level-at which the lender must evaluate the secondorder information. The process can be repeated iteratively until some external
circumstance (other than the assertion of information itself) provides 7an indepen1
dent indication of the reliability of one of the levels of information.
As the various examples in the later parts of this article explain, the secondorder information provided by the bond often is more reliable than the firstorder information directly asserted by the borrower because of the consequence
of falsity of the second-order information: the borrower must forfeit the bond.
The bond imposes a penalty on the borrower-something that costs the borrower an amount greater than the amount it stands to gain from falsehood-to
ensure that the borrower has an adequate motivation to tell the truth.
It is important to examine the incentives that determine the size and nature of
the bond. Ideally, the parties would design a bond of asymmetric value, so that
action by the lender to execute on the bond would impose a very large loss upon
the borrower, but produce only a small gain for the lender. To understand that
point, consider the analysis that rational parties would use in designing such a
transaction.
First, the benefits of the bonding mechanism increase with the loss that the
borrower would face upon forfeiture of the bond-the greater the loss, the less
likely the borrower will be to provide false information. That should be true
whether the information in question involves factual assertions or forecasts. If it
involves factual assertions, the prospect of a future loss should the falsehood of
those assertions be discovered motivates the borrower to provide truthful assertions. If the information involves forecasts of events within the borrower's
control, the continuing threat of a loss for actions inconsistent with the forecasts
motivates the borrower to act in the future so as to cause the forecasts to come
true. Thus, in either case, an increase in the loss that the borrower can suffer
should increase the verificatory power of the bond.

that he in fact was truthful at the time he granted the bond to the lender because at the time his actual
intent was that he would perform as promised.
17. For an understanding of how that works in practice, see, for example, infra Part liA (discussing
the circumstances in which a guarantor's assertion might be more reliable than a borrower's).
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Unfortunately, the costs of the bonding mechanism also are likely to increase
with the value of the bond. That is true for two general reasons. First, the error
costs of any such mechanism increase with the size of the bond, because
erroneous execution on the bond increases the size of the loss from an error,
even if the error is innocent.' 8 More important, however, an increase in the
benefit that the lender receives from erroneous execution on the bond increases
the costs of opportunism. The greater the profit to the lender from forfeiture of
the bond, the greater the incentive for the lender to execute on the bond
opportunistically, even if the assertions of the borrower turn out to be true. 19
Both of those problems can be mitigated to some extent by practices that
enhance the objectivity of the circumstances that justify the lender in executing
on the bond.20
Another way to lower the expected costs of opportunism is to devise a
mechanism in which the benefits to the lender of retaining the bond are
substantially less than the costs to the borrower of forfeiture of the bond. That
can be accomplished in two ways. The first, which involves an asymmetrically
punitive bond, is well known. In that arrangement, the borrower posts a bond
that has some idiosyncratic value to the borrower, so that the asset is significantly more valuable to the borrower than it is to the lender.21 The secondwhat I call the interlocking-bond arrangement-is not so well recognized. In
that arrangement, the process for forfeiting the bonds is structured so that the
lender effectively posts its reputation as a bond against improper execution of
the bond posted by the borrower; the result is an interlocking verification
arrangement, with each party posting a bond to the other.22 In that case, the
18. See Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer SupracompensatoryRemedies: An Analysis
of Contractingfor Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 375 (1990) (explaining that the costs of
unprofitable performance increase with an increase in the size of the damage award).
19. See Charny, supra note 15, at 422 (criticizing the in terrorem effect that can come from
opportunistic exercise of nonlegal sanctions). As Omri Ben-Shahar points out to me, the possibility of
renegotiation between the borrower and the lender also limits the potential for opportunistic execution,
but given the unpredictability of the results of that renegotiation, it is unlikely that it will remove
entirely the ex ante perception of the possibility of opportunistic execution.
20. See, e.g., infra note 122 (discussing the types of defaults on which lenders rely to justify serious
remedial actions in commercial lending transactions).
21. In the hostage literature, that institution is known as the "ugly princess" (in Oliver Williamson's
terminology) or "puny prince" (in Bob Scott's terminology). See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory
of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 930 (1986). For one example, see infra note 59
(discussing a pledge of stock necessary for the borrower to control the corporation in question).
22. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 97-100 (discussing interlocking-bond arrangements in
the venture-capital context). Earlier writers have recognized the use of a reputational bond to limit the
likelihood that a lender will engage in opportunistic conduct. See, e.g., Niloy Bose & Richard Cothren,
Asymmetric Information and Loan Contracts in a Neoclassical Growth Model, 29 J. MONEY, CREDrr &
BANKING 423, 429-30 (1997); Timothy J. Muris, OpportunisticBehavior and the Law of Contracts, 65
MINN. L. REv. 521, 527 (1981) (referring to reputation as the main constraint on opportunistic
behavior); Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, Reputation and Conflict of Interest in the Issuance of Public
Securities: Evidence from Venture Capital 30-31 (Mar. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (arguing that reputation constrains venture capitalists from large sales of their interests when
companies in their portfolios issue securities). They have not, however, noticed the general success of
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great harms that the borrower might suffer from forfeiture of its reputational
bond are offset by the harms the lender might suffer if it took the borrower's
bond improperly. That arrangement substantially mitigates the lender's incentive to act opportunistically.
One important implication of the foregoing is that the amount of the ideal
bond (at least from the perspective of the parties to the transaction) often would
be punitive, not merely compensatory-that is, the loss to the borrower would
exceed the total anticipated gain from falsehood divided by the anticipated
probability of the discovery of the falsehood. 23 The reason is that, in the context
of the bonding mechanism, the size of the benefit from increasing the amount of

the bond-enhancement of the ex ante perception that the borrower will suffer a
harm from falsehood-is logically unrelated to the size of the ex post benefit
that the borrower obtains from falsehood-some unrelated benefit from diversion of funds or from some risky activity that led to the lack of funds. 24
To understand that point, consider the approach parties would follow if they
attempted to design a perfectly compensatory bond to prevent the borrower
from acting inconsistently with a forecast that the borrower would repay a loan.
The parties would want the bond to be at least large enough that the gain to the
borrower from not repaying the loan would be smaller than the loss to the
borrower from forfeiture of the bond.2 5 Approaching that problem ex ante, the
parties would recognize the likelihood that the gains to the borrower from
falsehood in the future might exceed the amount of the funds not paid over to
the parallel interlocking arrangement that I describe here. For a rare exception, see D. Gordon Smith,
Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 133, 138-40
(1998) (analyzing venture-capital transactions as a cooperative relationship involving devices to protect
against agency costs on both sides).
23. I do not consider the external effects on third parties and thus make no claims about the
efficiency of the institutions that I discuss. My only goal is to understand why rational parties might
choose the devices I observe in commerce.
24. I part ways at this point from David Charny, who criticizes reputational sanctions because of the
difficulty in setting the sanctions at a precisely compensatory level. See Charny, supra note 15, at 420. I
do not think that my analysis is inconsistent with Alan Schwartz's prominent rejection of the rationality
of punitive remedies. His analysis is limited by its terms to cases in which the parties share the same
estimate of the probability of breach. See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 393-94. I consider only cases in
which one party (the lender) has reason to believe that the breach estimate of the other party (the
borrower) is different from its own. In those cases, I believe that Schwartz would agree that institutions
such as those that I describe help the lender to distinguish productively between good and bad
borrowers. See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 220 (1989)
(arguing that the ability of borrowers to offer credible signals of their quality permits a segmentation of
the lending market into good and bad borrowers).
25. As Bob Scott puts it:
An effective commitment by Debtor includes any maneuver that will leave Debtor in the
position for which the option of choosing to default ... is no longer realistic because it
imposes more costs than any benefits Debtor could derive from cheating. A credible commitment thus requires Debtor to assume a sufficiently severe penalty so that in all cases she
would prefer to carry out her promise to pay in full ....
Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive CreditorRemedies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 747
(1989).
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the lender. Among other things, that could be true because of a liquidity
problem that limited the borrower's ability to obtain funds elsewhere, coupled
with a need to expend funds to avoid large losses (such as complete failure of
the borrower's business). Because of the distinction between the potential
benefits to the borrower from misconduct and the potential harm to the lender of
misconduct, a penalty large enough to ensure that no borrower ever could gain
from diversion of funds would have to be quite large, perhaps several multiples
of the amount of the funds at stake. 26
The consequences of that analysis are striking. First, viewed ex ante, almost
any increase in the size of the bond would present some positive benefit in
decreasing the likelihood of future falsehood, 27 suggesting that the only significant constraint on the size of the bond would be the costs of potential opportunism by the lender. Thus, the parties might have an incentive to continue
increasing the size of the ideal bond far beyond the amount of the funds
involved in the transaction, until the point at which the potential opportunism
costs exceed any additional gains to be had from increased deterrence of
falsehood. If (as suggested above) the parties can devise an arrangement in

which the potential opportunism costs do not rise directly with increases in the
cost to the borrower of forfeiture of the bond, the breakpoint-at which
increased costs from opportunism would exceed increased gains from further
deterrence-might be quite high.
At first glance, it might seem that the punitive bond approach would be
unattractive because it would force the borrower to repay a loan even if the
borrower had a use for the funds at the time repayment was due that promised a
greater profit than the loss that the lender would suffer from the payment
28
deferral: in other words, the bond might deter an efficient breach. That
possibility is surely a cost of the arrangement, and a rational borrower considering the arrangement would have to take account of such possible losses in

determining whether the bonding mechanism is acceptable. 2 9 But that possibility does not vitiate the potential value of the bonding mechanism. The principal
goal of the bonding mechanism is not to influence the borrower to make a
value-decreasing choice at the moment when payment is due. On the contrary,
the point of the bonding mechanism is to influence the borrower during the
26. A similar analysis would apply to assertions or forecasts related to events other than the payment
of money. I use the monetary example only because it is one for which the value of nonperformance is
most easily differentiated from the compensatory damage remedy.
27. Cf. Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY L.J. 587,
601 (1995) ("[S]ince easier and expanded access to coercive remedies means a larger expected penalty
in the event of a default, both the signal and bond become stronger as the lender's power to seize and
sell property following a default become greater.").
28. The possibility of renegotiation at the time the payment is due also could prevent the mechanism
from imposing losses by deterring efficient breaches. As discussed below, however, the bonding
mechanism is most effective in cases in which renegotiation is made difficult or impossible. See infra
text accompanying notes 44-47. Thus, at least in those cases, the cost of deterring efficient breach must
be taken into account as a cost of the mechanism.
29. See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 375.
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period that elapses between the date the loan is made and the date payment is
due.3 ° If the bonding mechanism works properly, the borrower will have an
incentive to minimize the possibility that a liquidity problem would occur that
would make payment difficult. 3 ' The bonding mechanism should motivate the
borrower to take care lest the borrower be in a position to suffer serious losses if
it makes the required payment.
Thus, at least for borrowers that do not appear at the time of the loan likely to
face serious liquidity crises at the time payment is due, the benefits from
accepting a bonding mechanism (and committing to prudent behavior) easily
could exceed the costs of being coerced by a punitive bond into making a
value-decreasing payment. To put it another way, the bonding mechanism is
most attractive to borrowers for whom the likelihood of payment difficulties
(and their attendant costs) is sufficiently small to render trivial the ex ante costs
of accepting a device that forces payment even in the face of such difficulties. 32
Second, viewed ex post (as it would be by a court evaluating the arrangement), the loss imposed by a large bond often might appear to be excessive,
because the loss to the lender from breach would be unlikely to exceed the
amount of the unpaid funds by any significant amount even accounting for
interest and other transaction costs of collection.3 3 Because of the general
reluctance of courts to enforce contractual provisions that they perceive to be
"penalties,"- 34 that appearance complicates matters considerably. The problem
30. For that reason, I do not think that Aghion & Hermalin's analysis of punitive contract sanctions
is relevant here. See Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts
Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381 (1990). They argue that legal restrictions on punitive
contract sanctions are efficient because they protect good borrowers from the "additional risks imposed
by costly signaling." Id. at 382. If, however, as I argue, the sanction principally targets conduct that is
within the control of the borrower, then the signaling imposes no significant additional risks, because
the borrower that issues the signal should know that it will not engage in the contract that will result in
punitive sanctions.
31. Or, which is much the same thing from an ex ante perspective, the mechanism will be attractive
only to borrowers that believe that they would act prudently during the entire period even without the
bonding mechanism.
32. For a similar line of reasoning, see Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23
RAND J. EcON. 432, 432-34 (1992). Spier offers the somewhat implausible example of a well-advised
athlete, who might "refrain from asking for an injury clause, because the team manager would infer
from such a request that the athlete is more accident prone and would make the terms of the contract
worse." Id. at 433.
33. I differ from Samuel Rea on the significance of the compensatory damage amount. Samuel Rea
briefly considers the possibility that parties might use penalty clauses as a signal in the fashion that I
describe. See Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 147, 156-57 (1984). He rejects that possibility, however, on the theory that a rational
buyer would purchase from "the lowest-cost seller offering full compensation in the event of breach."
Id. That response, however, assumes that some legal remedy is available that offers costless, perfectly
calculated, immediate, and guaranteed compensation for misconduct. The world I study is a world in
which that is impossible.
34. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.10, at 128 (4th ed. 1992) ("[I]f it
is plain from the beginning that the specification is designed to give the victim of the breach much more
than he could expect actually to lose from the breach, or the contract breaker to gain, then it is a penalty
clause and is unenforceable."); Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of Judicial Reconstruction of Contracts, 71
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would be exacerbated further if courts examined the lender's conduct to determine if the execution of the bond is a "value-maximizing" action at the time it
is taken.35 In sum, any legal rule that limits the ability of the lender to execute
on the bond limits the efficacy of the arrangement and frustrates the intent of the
parties. 36
The result of such rules, and a common theme of the later parts of this article,
is that constraints on legal enforcement drive contracting parties even further
from the legal system and toward more frequent use of contracting mechanisms
that do not depend on-and cannot be stymied (or regulated) by-the legal
system. Parties can achieve that result in two general ways: by designing the
bond so that its retention does not appear to impose a penalty (generally because
the high value of the bond is caused only by its particular utility for the
borrower) 37 or by designing the bond so that 38
legal enforcement is not necessary
for its forfeiture (as in the case of reputation).
C. A FEW DIFFICULTIES

One serious impediment to the effectiveness of the bonding mechanisms
described above is the difficulty of finding a way to make the threat credible.3 9
For the bonding mechanism to alter the incentives of the borrower, the borrower
has to believe that the lender actually will follow through on a threat to execute
on the bond, even if execution causes a loss to the borrower that exceeds the
gain to the lender in that transaction. Three general considerations might limit
the credibility of the threat. First, the existence of norms against destructive
behavior often might decrease the lender's willingness to follow through on its

IND. L.J. 45, 59 (1995) ("At its core, the rule prohibits parties from writing damage clauses in contracts
that they expect will overcompensate the promisee on breach."). As Gergen shows, that rule is not
applied nearly so consistently as the doctrinal statement suggests. See id. at 63-69. It is, though,
sufficiently powerful to undermine the legal enforceability of the arrangements that I discuss here. See
id. at 67-69 (discussing cases that invalidate clauses based on opportunistic behavior by the beneficiary
of the clause).
35. It is difficult to say that courts in fact take that approach, but a number of academics have
recommended that they do. See POSNER, supra note 34, § 4.1, at 92 (suggesting that the law generally
assumes that the parties did not intend to permit literal enforcement of apparently one-sided arrangements); Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary Damagesfor Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Private Law
Theory, 1 THEoRETicAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript on file with author) (general
discussion of a "more cooperative" conception of good faith); Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms
in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 997, 1064-72 (1992) (urging courts to interpret open terms in contracts
as requiring value-maximizing performance).
36. Posner questions the law's hostility to such arrangements, but does not attempt to explain why
parties might select punitive penalty arrangements. See POSNER, supra note 34, § 4.10, at 129; see also
John R. Lott, Jr., The Level of Optimal Fines To Prevent Fraud When Reputations Exist and Penalty
Clauses Are Unenforceable, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 363, 367 (1996) (noting the inconsistency between the position that it is inefficient for contract penalty clauses to be enforced and the view
that it is appropriate for the government to enforce penalty sanctions).
37. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 62-65 (discussing pawn-shop transactions).
38. See, e.g., infra Part IIc2 (discussing reputational sanctioning).
39. I thank Jeff Mackie-Mason and Omri Ben-Shahar for pushing me to think about that point.
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threat.4° Second, if there is any doubt about the propriety of the execution on
the bond by the lender, the lender might worry that execution would harm the
reputation of the lender.4 ' The problems of norms impeding execution and
possible reputational losses may occur in specific circumstances, but they seem
unlikely to pose a general barrier to establishing the credibility of enforcement.
The third problem-more general and thus less tractable-is the possibility of
renegotiation: if the loss to the borrower exceeds the gain to the lender, a
borrower might be able to buy off a lender by offering some amount that
exceeds the amount the lender would gain from execution on the bond but
nevertheless is less than the amount the borrower would lose from execution on
the bond.4 2 Not surprisingly, such bargaining seems to be a prominent feature of
the end-game of large commercial loans involving sophisticated parties. 43
Several potential responses offset that difficulty. For one thing, it is not clear
that the possibility of renegotiation renders the bonding mechanism ineffective. 4 Although it is likely to prevent the lender from extracting the full amount
of its asymmetrically punitive bond, even a consensual renegotiation at the
point of the end-game puts the borrower at a risk of a substantial loss, because it
is difficult for the borrower to predict in advance that it will fare well in such a
negotiation. The lender's ability to insist on the full penalty effectively sets a
lower bound on the end-game for a defaulting borrower, so that the borrower is
highly unlikely to escape without paying some amount at least equal to the
value that the lender could obtain if it executed the bond. Thus, even a
renegotiable bonding mechanism should have a substantial effect on the borrower's incentives.
Moreover, in many contexts renegotiation will not be available to allow the
borrower to avoid the full impact of the punitive bond. Most generally, because
of the limited cognitive capabilities of borrowers and lenders, it often might be

40. At this point I should mention what should be obvious by now: my discussion of bonds and
hostages is devoted entirely to the question of their potential to increase the gains from contracting
between the parties that use them. Like most prior writers in the area, I do not attempt to evaluate the
moral and distributional implications of those devices. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 35, at 1001-02. It is
obvious that those considerations can make the devices that I discuss quite troubling, at least in
situations where they are used by parties that are not thoroughly sophisticated. See, e.g., Ian R.
MacNeil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich
ClassificatoryApparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1018, 1056-62 (1981) (arguing that the American legal
system generally limits unilateral contractual power).
41. That problem is an artifact of the interlocking-bonds arrangement discussed above. Although it
could be mitigated by fashioning objective descriptions of the events that would justify execution on
the bond, in many circumstances that will not be practical.
42. See, e.g., Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, Contractual Intermediaries 11 (Oct. 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (explaining that reputational bonding mechanisms are ineffective where
it is feasible for the parties to renegotiate to avoid imposition of the penalty).
43. See infra note 122 (discussing case studies describing that outcome).
44. Another benefit from the potential for renegotiation is that it reduces the ex ante costs from the
bond's potential to deter efficient breaches of the payment obligation. That is particularly true if, as
seems likely, the lender is particularly likely to renegotiate in cases in which it believes that the
borrower is acting in good faith to fulfill its obligations as soon as possible.
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impractical to resolve smaller problem loan transactions by rational negotiations
between the parties. 45 Perhaps most important, even a thoroughly rational (some
might say Machiavellian) lender might execute on the bond, solely for the
purpose of establishing the credibility of the threat against others. That kind of
in terrorem activity would be rational if the loss in the selected case of
scorched-earth collection was exceeded by the gains from enhancing the lender's negotiating power in the future and from inducing prudent behavior from
future borrowers.4 6
One final possible response to renegotiation is a system in which the loss is
inflicted more or less automatically upon default, so that the lender's ability to
renegotiate and withhold enforcement is limited. One prominent example of that
practice is the clearinghouse that forces Japanese lenders to provide information
about payment defaults on certain types of promissory notes.4 7 A similar though
less formal arrangement operates in the context of publicly traded securities in
the United States. Absent a bankruptcy proceeding, renegotiation is impractical
because of the large number of lenders. Because information of a payment
default inevitably is widely disseminated, a payment default inevitably results in
a serious reputational harm to the borrower.4 8
Another difficulty to address is whether the bonding mechanism ever can
produce a benefit large enough to justify the transaction costs of implementing
the mechanism. After all, the most that the bond can do is enhance the
likelihood that the lender ultimately will be repaid. The greatest benefit that the
borrower can obtain from the bond is that it lowers the cost to the borrower by
an amount equal to the expected present value of the increased likelihood of
repayment. But any such diminution in the present fees charged to the borrower
must be matched precisely by an increase in the future costs to the borrower
reflected in the increased likelihood that the borrower in fact will repay the
funds in the future. Thus, if creation of the bonding mechanism imposes any
transaction costs at all, it is difficult to see how the borrower possibly could gain
from agreeing to the mechanism.
The answer is that the arrangement functions not only to alter the likelihood
that the borrower will perform as agreed, but also to allow the borrower to
signal its character by demonstrating that it is the type of entity that will

45. See infra text accompanying note 74 (discussing evidence related to liquidation of defaulting
consumer loans).
46. See Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 227-32 (discussing that point); Scott, supra note
25, at 749-51, 773. An acquaintance of mine familiar with the collection practices of a large national
retailer (which should go unnamed) assures me that the retailer has an affirmative policy consistent with
the statement in the text. The retailer occasionally uses vigorous collection tactics against particular
consumer borrowers, even though the tactics are not cost-effective in the individual case.
47. See infra text accompanying note 119 (discussing that system).
48. That effect depends, of course, on the impracticality of renegotiation. For a recent and thoughtful
proposal that would create a trustee with the power to renegotiate on behalf of the bondholders as a
group, see Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REv.
447 (1999).
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perform as agreed. Remember, the basic problem is that the borrower is in a
better position to know the truth of an assertion than the lender. If the borrower
knows (or thinks it highly likely) that it will repay the funds even without the
bonding mechanism, then (opportunism by the lender aside) the mechanism
imposes no payment costs on the borrower, because the mechanism does not
alter the likelihood of repayment. Thus, the bonding mechanism permits the
lender to distinguish between borrowers that believe themselves likely to perform as they promise and those that do not. 49 The more likely the borrower
believes it is to perform, the lower the costs of the bonding mechanism, and
thus the more attractive the lower price that comes with the bonding mechanism. Those that believe themselves less likely to perform will be more likely to
prefer transactions without the costs of the mechanism, but with the higher costs
that come from the absence of the verification institution.5 °
One final caveat is in order. All of the foregoing analysis presupposes a high
degree of analytical rationality and foresight on the part of all of the contracting
parties. That is not because I believe that all people act rationally in all
situations. 5 ' Hence, the analysis of this article has little or nothing to say about
transactions involving consumers and less sophisticated small businesses. Moreover, it might be unreasonable to expect the necessary level of rigorous rationality even from relatively large and sophisticated entities.5 2 Don Langevoort, in
particular, has shown that the internal dynamics of large business enterprises
often create systematic barriers to the accurate collection and analysis of
information relevant to important decisions. 53 Finally, even if the parties understand the ramification of the mechanisms that they adopt, they might misapprehend the probabilities of the adverse events that would call those mechanisms
54
into play.

49. See Spier, supra note 32 (providing general formal analysis of the use of contract clauses as a
signalling device to resolve information asymmetries). The ability of lenders to use such strategies to
separate borrowers based on risk is crucial to a well-functioning credit market. Absent a mechanism for
assessing the differing risks of borrowers, lenders would fall into the famous "credit-rationing" trap
described by Stiglitz and Weiss. See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets
with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 393, 395 (1981) (presenting the classic model of credit
rationing, which rests on the assumption that banks cannot ascertain the riskiness of any particular
project).
50. For a numerical example of how that could work out in a particular context, see Mann, Temporal
Priority,supra note 6, at 27-31.
51. See generally, Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 1471, 1476-79 (1998) (summarizing the distinctions between the predictions of rational-actor
theory and the behavior of actual people).
52. See, e.g., Manuel A. Utset, Innovation & Governance: High-Powered Incentives, Opportunism,
and Venture Capital Contracts 55-63 (Feb. 24, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(providing reasons why entrepreneurs might enter into opportunistic contracts with venture capitalists
without understanding the problems with those contracts).
53. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101 (1997).
54. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 51, at 1480 ("[B]ounded rationality as it relates to decisionmaking behavior will come into play whenever actors are valuing outcomes ..
"). For a sampling of the
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But that problem is outside the scope of the article. Collecting empirical data
on why businesses adopt particular contracts is extraordinarily difficult. Hence,
it is not possible to prove directly that the motivations I explain in this part of
the article cause businesses to adopt the various mechanisms that I am about to
describe. My goal, rather, is to show how the actual practices of businesses may
be consistent with the adoption of verification mechanisms for the theoretical
reasons that I have described above. In other words, the persuasive force of my
analysis should come from its ability to make sense of the wide variety of
practices analyzed below.
II. A

TYPOLOGY OF INSTITUTIONS FOR VERIFYING INFORMATION

Part I proceeded at a high level of abstraction because its purpose was to
describe a general framework for the structure of institutions for verifying
information in financing transactions. This part of the article uses that framework to provide a more empirically grounded description of actual transactions.
The empirical description makes no effort to provide a complete picture of those
transactions. On the contrary, the description is consciously stylized to illustrate
the extent to which the broad range of transactions can be understood as more
or less successful manifestations of the bonding device described in Part I. The
description is designed to show that the perspective outlined above provides a
sufficiently rich view of a diverse group of transactions to persuade the reader
that my perspective captures a significant part of the motivation for the transactions described in the rest of the article.
With those qualifications in mind, I have divided the description into three
parts, based on three general ways in which the borrower can post a bond with
the lender: by posting collateral with the lender, by com'rmitting relation-specific
assets to the transaction, or by investing in reputation.
A. COLLATERAL

The first device is the simplest. The borrower can post specific assets as
collateral with the lender and grant the lender the right to retain the assets if the
assertions of the borrower are (or become) false. Although transactions that use
collateral are a common feature of our economy, 55 it is not clear to what extent
the collateral is posted to serve the bonding function described in this article. To
examine that question, the following sections examine three general types of
empirical evidence suggesting that entrepreneurs tend to be unduly optimistic, see Arnold C. Cooper et
al., Entrepreneur's Chances for Success, 8 J. Bus. VENTURING 97 (1993) (presenting the results of an
empirical study indicating that entrepreneurs are unduly optimistic about the prospects for success by
their businesses); Leslie Palisch & D. Ray Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory To Explain Entrepreneurial
Risk-Taking: Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10 J. Bus. VENTURING 425 (1995) (presenting the
results of an empirical study indicating that entrepreneurs overestimate the chances of success in
equivocal business scenarios).
55. See Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 627 & n.1 (reporting statistics that
support an estimate of at least two trillion dollars of outstanding secured debt in this country).
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transactions in which collateral-like devices are used: possessory secured transactions, nonpossessory secured transactions, and software financing transactions. The final section of this portion of the article pauses to evaluate the
analogous law-centered mechanism, a lawsuit for misrepresentation.
1. Possessory Secured Transactions
The oldest type of secured transaction is the classic pledge, in which the
borrower delivers the collateral into the possession of the lender. As it happens,
the pledge does not play a major role in modem financing transactions; most
modem commercial secured transactions fall into the nonpossessory category
discussed in the next section.
The framework summarized in Part I suggests two reasons why a possessory
secured transaction ordinarily is an unsuitable arrangement for providing a bond
to a lender. First, posting assets with the lender often takes the assets out of a
productive use; it is costly for a manufacturer to put its drill press in the bank
vault as a condition for a loan transaction. If a transaction requires the borrower
to remove productive assets from use, the foregone income from those assets
becomes a cost of the transaction. Second, our legal system is likely to resist
enforcement of such a transaction in any case in which the asset posted as a
bond is designed to cause a loss to the borrower that exceeds the loss suffered
by the lender. The common law characterizes such an arrangement as a "penalty" and responds with significant obstacles to enforcement of the agreed-upon
arrangement. 56 Furthermore, the legal rules associated with retention of collateral generally require the lender to return to the borrower any amount by which
the value of the
collateral exceeds the outstanding amount of the loan advanced
57
lender.
by the
Direct pledges, however, do survive in a variety of contexts. Probably the
most common is the pledge of passive income-producing assets (such as
certificates of deposit or securities). Because those assets produce value for the
borrower even while in the possession of the lender, a transaction posting the
assets does not present the foregone income problem directly. 58 On the other
hand, because the remedy of the lender in those transactions typically is limited
to retention of financial assets with a value equal to the amount of the obligation
to be secured (together with any incidental transaction costs), the loss of such
assets ordinarily inflicts only compensatory damages. 59
56. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
57. See RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 6.4(a) (1997) (articulating that rule for
real-property transactions); U.C.C. §§ 9-608(a)(4), 9-615(d) (articulating that rule for personal-property
transactions).
58. The pledge still might impose some opportunity cost by limiting the liquidity of the investment
portfolio of the borrower, but that does not strike me as a major organizing feature of the arrangement.
59. That may not always be true. For example, if the taxpayer's basis in the stock is lower than the
stock's value (a common situation in an era of rapidly increasing stock markets), liquidation of the
stock would impose a loss on the borrower (in the amount of the taxes the borrower must pay on the
gain from liquidation). Similarly, consider the pledge of a controlling block of stock, the loss of which
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Thus, properly understood, those transactions do not appear to involve the
use of collateral as a bonding mechanism of the kind I describe here. Rather, the
collateral in those cases appears to function directly to reduce the ex ante costs
of anticipated defaults by increasing the ex post likelihood of coerced collection. 60 Because the collateral only enhances the likelihood of involuntary
collection through liquidation of the collateral, it does not generally provide the
incentive-altering effects on which I focus. 6 1 If loss of the collateral does not
threaten the borrower with a significant loss-a loss that is, for the reasons
explained in Part I, a substantially punitive loss-then the collateral does
nothing to increase the borrower's incentive to conduct its affairs prudently.
There may be transactions in which it is worthwhile to post collateral without
those incentive-altering effects, but because they will be limited to cases in
which the opportunity costs of delivering the collateral to the lender are small,
they do not provide a general device for financing ongoing business enterprises.
That is not to say that a possessory secured transaction could not function as
an effective bonding mechanism. For example, consider the most common
consumer possessory secured transaction: the pawn. For several reasons, the
pawn is likely to provide a significantly more effective device than a typical
commercial possessory secured transaction. Because pawned assets have an
idiosyncratic value to the pawnor that exceeds their liquidation value to the
pawnbroker, forfeiture imposes a substantially punitive loss that makes the
pawn an effective bond.62 And because the pawnbroker will not be able to
liquidate the pawn at a price that reflects that idiosyncratic value, the pawn is
only asymmetrically punitive, diminishing the pawnbroker's incentive for opportunistic liquidation of the pawn. Finally, and most important for my purpose,
that punitive loss is unlikely to be mitigated by legal concerns about penalties.
For one thing, the small size of the average transaction 63 and relative indigence
of the average pawnor makes it unlikely that many pawn transactions will result
in litigation. 64 And even if the transaction does result in litigation, the punitive
would deprive the borrower of control of the corporation in question. In that case, loss of the stock
might inflict a punitive sanction by depriving the borrower of control of the corporation in addition to
the loss of the market value of the lost shares. Furthermore, if the lender is unable to obtain the control
premium when it liquidates the shares, the transaction presents the asymmetrically punitive arrangement that minimizes the lender's incentive for opportunism.
60. See Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 639 (describing that effect as one of
several potential advantages of secured lending transactions).
61. The transaction costs associated with involuntary payment through liquidation of the collateral
might increase the likelihood of voluntary performance. That strikes me, however, as a relatively
insignificant aspect of such a transaction.
62. The pawn could bear an idiosyncratic value to the borrower not only because of some kind of
heirloom value (which might be difficult for the pawnbroker to verify) but also because of the typical
phenomenon that the salvage value of consumer goods is quite low compared to their value in the hands
of those who own and use them.
63. See JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 26
(1994) (reporting statistics indicating that the average pawn transaction in 1991 was for approximately $60).
64. Cf. id. at 118-19 (arguing that regulation of pawnshops is appropriate because of the inability of
pawnshop customers to protect themselves from unscrupulous practices).
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nature of the loss would be likely to elude legal notice, because it is an artifact
not of a high market value of the asset, but of the asset's high idiosyncratic
value to the pawnor.65

2. Nonpossessory Secured Transactions
Given the problems discussed in the preceding section, it should be no
surprise that most modern commercial secured transactions do not contemplate
that the creditor will retain possession of the collateral during the pendency of
the relationship. Rather, in the typical arrangement, the borrower retains possession of the collateral and the lender places a filing in a public record that gives
third parties notice of the creditor's claim against the collateral.66 The question
for this article is whether, in those transactions, collateral actually is used as a
bonding mechanism.
A full answer to that question must await considerably more empirical
evidence than we yet have. As Bob Scott and I have suggested in earlier work,
however, there is reason to believe that the bonding phenomenon does play
some role in the decision of businesses to use collateral in their lending
transactions.6 7 Thus, lenders might take a lien on collateral expecting that the
disastrous losses from repossession and liquidation by the lender would induce
the borrower to repay the loan even if repayment alone is not value-increasing
for the borrower at the time payment comes due.6 8 Although different scholars
have different perspectives on the question,6 9 some scholars believe that much
of the force of secured credit comes from the leverage that the lender holds in
that transaction: repossession and liquidation cost the borrower much more than
65. My view that pawn transactions rest on an effective bonding mechanism is descriptive and not
normative. It would be easy to object to those transactions on the ground that they typically involve
consumers who are less likely than commercial enterprises to understand with full rationality the
consequences of the transactions into which they have entered. See supra text accompanying notes
51-54 (discussing that problem generally).
66. For the most detailed discussions of the relation between filings and nonpossessory lending
transactions, compare Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An
Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175 (1983) (arguing that filings should be
required in all such transactions, including leases that serve the same function), with Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of
ProposalsTo Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 683 (1988) (rejecting Baird and
Jackson's analysis).
67. See Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 645-49, 655-56 (describing the
benefits of the increased leverage created in secured lending transactions); Scott, supra note 21, at
926-28 (suggesting that borrowers in commercial lending transactions grant collateral that functions as
a hostage for the lender); see also Letsou, supra note 27, at 593 (making a similar point in the consumer
context: "By subjecting themselves to coercive remedies that allow lenders to seize debtor property or
wages ... borrowers are able to assure lenders that both the default risk and the expected costs of
collection associated with their loans will be low.").
68. See Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 646-48 (providing a numerical
example illustrating that point).
69. The literature on the reasons for secured credit is extensive. For a critical summary of that
literature, see id. at 627-30.

1999]

VERIFICATION INSTITUTIONS IN FINANCING TRANSACTIONS

2245

they aid the lender. 70 To the extent that is true, it provides a signal example of
the asymmetrically punitive bonding mechanism on which this article focuses.
Evidence from two of my empirical studies suggests, however, that the
significance of the bonding mechanism to the practice of secured credit is
overstated. The problem comes from the relatively low values at which lenders
tend to be able to liquidate the assets of their borrowers. 7' Because the borrower
often is able to liquidate (or buy) the assets at a price higher than the price at
which the lender could liquidate 72them, mainstream commercial lenders apparently liquidate assets quite rarely.
Because liquidation occurs quite rarely, and because the reason for the rarity
is the perception of the parties that liquidation is costly for the lender, the threat
of liquidation by the mainstream commercial lender is so weak that the incentive effects of the transaction are quite limited. Thus, I believe that in most
mainstream commercial contexts the primary motivation for secured credit is
not the incentive-altering effects that would come from a bonding mechanism,
but rather secured credit's ability to limit subsequent borrowing by giving notice
of the lender's interest in the borrower's assets.7 3
As with my similar generalization about the limited significance of bonding
effects in the possessory secured-credit context, some counter-examples are
apparent. For example, substantial evidence indicates that forced liquidation
does occur with some frequency in the consumer context. 4 More to the point of

this article, my impression-as yet unsupported by any substantial evidence-is
that a significant amount of foreclosure does occur in commercial loans to
marginal businesses. In my Strategy and Force article, I described a system
70. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179,
2188-89 (1994); David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 CARDOzo L. REv.
1635, 1679-80 (1998) ("[P]ower is the main thing.... Any theory of secured lending must concentrate
primarily on power."); Letsou, supra note 27, at 597-98; Scott, supra note 21, at 926-27; George G.
Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 246-47
(1992).
71. That problem is particularly serious for small-business lenders, see Mann, Small-Business
Lending, supra note 6, at 15-19 (presenting evidence on that point), but surely is not limited to that
context, see Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 221-26 (presenting evidence on that point from
case studies of practices for dealing with problem loans at three large institutional lenders).
72. See Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 227 (summarizing the results of case studies).
73. See Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 641-45 (explaining how the ability to
limit subsequent borrowings is a significant benefit of a grant of collateral); Mann, Small-Business
Lending, supra note 6, at 25-26 (arguing that the ability to limit subsequent borrowing is the primary
motivation for small-business secured credit); see also Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority
in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1396, 1412-14 (1997) (arguing that firms issue secured debt to
prevent dilution of claims by debt issued to subsequent lenders). Bob Rasmussen has offered the
interesting suggestion that even the borrowing-limiting function could be treated as a bonding mechanism, on the theory that the elimination of future borrowing enhances the relational value of the prime
lending relationship, which enhances the bonded nature of that relationship.
74. See Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 227-32 (conjecture as to why forced liquidation
seems to occur more frequently in the consumer context). But cf Letsou, supra note 27, at 595-96
(suggesting that monitoring and bonding devices are less effective for consumers because of the small
size of the loans).
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under which commercial borrowers move from lender to lender depending upon
the riskiness of the borrower, with riskier borrowers going to more risk-tolerant
(and expensive) lenders, and safer borrowers going to less risk-tolerant (and less
expensive) lenders.7 5 But all three of the case studies that I presented in that
article involved mainstream lenders to profitable businesses: a bank, a multinational finance-company subsidiary, and a life-insurance company. 76 Thus, those

studies probably presented a slice of practices at the safe-to-medium portion of
the commercial lending range. A study of practices at the risky end of the
commercial lending range probably would reveal a much higher incidence of
forced liquidation. In that context, then, the bonding effects of collateral might
have considerable power.7 7

Mark Carey and his coauthors advance a related thesis in a recent paper. 78
They argue that the lending market is segmented not by the risk tolerance of the
lender, but by the willingness of the lender to act forcefully against the
borrower. The lender to low-risk businesses is less willing to take forceful
action, they argue, because of the possible adverse reputational effects of such
action. 79 Although that thesis offers an intriguing example of the interlockingbond arrangement that I emphasize in this article, 80 I doubt its broad applicability. My general impression (admittedly still anecdotal) is that lenders do not
worry that reputational markets will misinterpret forceful actions as misconduct,
because lenders tend to rely on objective evidence of borrower misconduct
(missed payments) to justify those actions. In my view, the reason that riskier
lenders are likely to take more forceful action than more conservative lenders is
that riskier lenders have more occasions to81 take such actions and thus develop
expertise in that type of collection activity.
If I am correct about the limited importance of the bonding effects of secured
transactions, that would have significant policy consequences, because it suggests that little is gained from legal rules that support those aspects of secured
transactions. Thus, for example, it might not significantly affect the availability
of credit if lenders were forced to set aside a portion of the proceeds of their
collateral to pay certain involuntary unsecured creditors.8 2 More radically, it
75. Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 215-19.
76. See id. at 163.
77. I am in the opening stages of a case study of a commercial accounts-receivable factor, which
does liquidate its collateral much more frequently.
78. See Mark Carey et al., Does Corporate Lending by Banks and Finance Companies Differ?
Evidence on Specialization in Private Debt Contracting, 53 J. FIN. 845, 870-71 (1998).
79. See id. at 847 ("High-risk borrowers are served by lenders known to be tough and unbending,
whereas lower-risk borrowers are served by those known to be gentle.").
80. For a general discussion of an interlocking-bond arrangement, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
81. Cf Letter from Gary F Winer, President, Monetrex, Inc., to Robert J. Mann [sic] (Mar. 30, 1998)
(arguing that his company has more expertise at forceful collection activity than a mainstream lender).
82. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Casefor the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 909-11 (1996); Memorandum from Elizabeth Warren to
Council of the American Law Institute 1 (Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with author) (making such a proposal);
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suggests, at least in some contexts, that lenders might be adequately protected
by some sort of negative lien that prevented others from gaining priority in
specified assets without giving the lender any right of liquidation.8 3
3. Software Financing
An analogous phenomenon is developing in the field of software financing.
Prominent licensors are reluctant to allow remarketing of their software by
lenders that might foreclose on a defaulting borrower/licensee.8 4 Hence, lenders
to borrower/licensees frequently are unable to obtain security interests to protect
their loans. What they can obtain, however, is a right to terminate the licensee's
interest under the license, which typically is described as "unsecured" software
financing. 85 Although it appears unlikely that the proposed Uniform Commercial Code provisions governing software licenses will validate that arrangement,86 the natural remedy for enforcing such a right would be through electronic
self-help that would allow the lender to terminate the licensee's
interest without
87
physical entry into the premises of the defaulting borrower.
That arrangement is an elegant example of the asymmetrically punitive bond.
On the one hand, the lender's incentive for opportunistic termination is relatively low, because the lender gains no monetary advantage from termination
and arguably would suffer some reputational harm if the termination was
unjustified. On the other hand, the remedy could be quite effective in imposing
leverage against the borrower, upon which termination of the license could
impose severe costs. Moreover, the ability of the lender to use electronic
self-help to execute on the bond removes many of the transaction costs (such as
the fee of the repossession agent) typical of the assets posted in more traditional
secured-credit contexts. The main problem with electronic self-help would be
making the threat credible: Will borrowers really believe that their lenders
would use such a procedure just because the borrower misses a few payments?
It is unsettling for a lender to obtain the right to disable software that might

see also Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 241-43 (reporting anecdotal interviews with
lenders generally indicating that the Warren proposal would not significantly constrict credit).
83. For a recent proposal to implement such a reform, together with detailed discussion of how such
a reform might work, see Carl S. Bjerre, Secured TransactionsInside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants,
Property,andPerfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305 (1999).
84. The licensors' principal concern appears to be a desire to prevent sales by lenders that would
undercut the licensors' ability to implement complex pricing schemes that impose different charges for
software use based upon the size and type of the company using the software. See Ronald J. Mann,
Secured Credit and Software Financing 21 (Jan. 28, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
85. See id. at 35-51 (discussing interviews describing this transaction).
86. Although the drafts for Article 2B at one time protected the right of self-help, they never
protected the right of the unsecured financier to use self-help. See UCC § 2B-715(b) (Proposed Draft
Aug. 1998) (granting a right of self-help only for "licensors"). I am not aware of any move by the
drafting committee to add such a provision.
87. See Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, supra note 84, at 49 n.147 (discussing the
mechanics of electronic self-help).
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be crucial to the borrower's operations, particularly when the loss of the
software might cause harm to third parties that rely on the borrower's continued
ability to operate. My goal here, however, is not to analyze the broader policy
implications of validating that device, which are serious. Rather, I mean only to
suggest that the device would be an unusually effective and inexpensive mechanism for verifying the seriousness of the borrower's commitment to performing
as agreed.
4. Lawsuits as a Verification Institution
As a legal academic, I have some obligation to include within my framework
the direct sanctions imposed by positive law to deter the misconduct at hand.
Thus, before moving to other topics, I address the simple lawsuit for misrepresentation, a subject not so far afield as it might seem at first glance. Such a lawsuit
rests on a legal rule that allows the lender to obtain assets of the borrower if the

borrower commits a sufficiently serious misrepresentation. 8 8 Thus, it can be
viewed as a standardized nonspecific pledge. That pledge, however, is created
not by the agreement of the parties, but exists as a background default procedure without the necessity for tailored contracting by the lender and the
borrower.
For a variety of reasons, however, the lawsuit often is considerably less
effective than the other institutions discussed in this section. The most obvious
reason is the extraordinarily high transaction costs of enforcement through
litigation, which generally requires considerable time, effort, and expense.
Furthermore, except in the most blatant circumstances, the lender will have
considerable doubt about its ability successfully to recover for what it perceives
to be a misrepresentation on the borrower's part. The lender might worry about
its ability to convince a court that the misstatement was intentional,89 to prove a
misstatement, or to collect a judgment even if it prevails. 90 That problem is
particularly serious in situations in which it is difficult for the parties to agree
upon specific contract language describing the desired performance. 9 ' Finally,
88. In this context, the lawsuit would be directly relevant only if the misrepresentation harmed the
lender in some way other than limiting the likelihood of repayment (because the borrower would be
obligated to repay the loan without regard to the accuracy of any underlying factual statements). The
point is important, however, to illustrate the comparative effectiveness of a legal remedy for false
statements and the various privately ordered remedies discussed elsewhere in this article.
89. As mentioned above, the parties often would agree that the lender could recover for any false
statement, without regard to intent or fault on the part of the borrower. See supra note 16. The standard
lawsuit for misrepresentation, however, is likely to require proof of at least negligence, if not
intentional misconduct by the borrower.
90. See, e.g., CASE STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION

10 (Scott E. Masten ed., 1996)

[hereinafter MASTEN CONTRACTING STUDIES] (summarizing the economic effects on contracting practices of the uncertainty of contract enforcement through the formal legal process); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 57
(1986) ("We cannot 'charge' individuals or corporations more than the value of their net assets in
response to business delicts.").
91. It is clear that parties consciously select such terms in many contexts. See Gergen, supra note 35,
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because of the general hostility of the legal system to penal sanctions, the lender
will be unlikely to obtain punitive damages in any but the most blatant cases,
which further limits any potential in terrorem effect from potential lawsuits for
misrepresentation. Thus, although the misrepresentation lawsuit certainly has
been an effective disciplining device in some contexts at some times in our legal
system, I seriously doubt its direct importance in the contexts addressed by this
article.9 2
B. RELATIONAL ASSETS

Although arranging for the borrower to hand assets over to the lender is the
simplest way to establish a bonding arrangement, it certainly is not the only
way. As Oliver Williamson demonstrated in his justly famous article on the
subject, contracting parties can accomplish the same thing through the use of
relational assets.93 Instead of posting a bond directly with the lender, the
borrower invests in relation-specific assets (specialized equipment, expertise,
and the like) that have a relatively low value in alternative uses (salvage). The
difference between the value of the assets in that relationship and their value in
any alternative use practicably available to the borrower provides a source of
"quasi rents" for the lender. Thus, if the lender takes an action that ends the
relationship and diverts the assets to the alternative uses, the borrower suffers a
94
substantial loss.

That arrangement has the potential to provide three general improvements
upon the simpler, more direct arrangements discussed in the preceding sections.
For one thing, because the assets that constitute the bond remain in the
borrower's control, the arrangement does not require the removal of assets from
productive use. The arrangement, however, is not costless. Aside from the
transaction costs of creating the arrangement, the need for the borrower to
structure its business to depend on relation-specific assets could impose costs by
leaving the borrower in a sub-optimal, inflexible condition. To put it another
way, relational assets should work better as a bond in contexts in which the
underlying economics of the business call for considerable asset specificity than
they would in contexts in which-absent the need for some verification instituat 1026-37 (providing a general theory of why open terms are useful when parties contract about assets
of uncertain value); Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 695-96 (providing a formal analysis of reasons for
incomplete contracting); Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 666-67 (discussing the
difficulties of using precise terms in commercial lending arrangements); Schwartz, supra note 9, at
278-81 (providing a typology of the causes of incomplete contracting). For a thorough theoretical
discussion of the difficulties of appropriate enforcement of nonspecific contract terms, see Gergen,
supra note 35, at 1019-25.
92. To the extent the lawsuit for misrepresentation has any significance, I would attribute that to the
lawsuit's indirect negative effect on the reputation of the borrower, a topic discussed infra Part Ic.
93. See Williamson, supra note 7; see also Rachel E. Kranton, The Formation of Cooperative
Relationships, 12 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 214, 219-27 (1996) (providing a formal model of the conditions
necessary for commencement of a long-term cooperative relationship).
94. For a general discussion of the concept of quasi-rents in relational contracting, see MASTEN
CONTRACTING STUDIES, supra note 90, at 13.
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tion-the borrower's assets would not be highly specific to its operations in the
transaction that involves the lender. If the borrower's assets would be specialized anyway, then the benefits of relation-specific assets can be obtained
without substantial alteration of investment policies.9 5
Another benefit of the arrangement is its ability to dispense with legal
enforcement. Many (if not most) of the collateral-like arrangements discussed in
the previous section of the article depend on some form of affirmative legal
action by which the lender executes the bond in response to misconduct by the
borrower. With relational assets, however, the action that imposes the loss need
not be a lawsuit; it might be a simple termination of the relationship, which
imposes costs by forcing a diversion of relation-specific assets to less valuable
alternative uses. As long as the law tolerates the termination, the arrangement
can function properly.
As a related point, because the harm to the borrower arises out of that indirect
diversion of assets to less valuable uses, it is not likely to be hindered by the
persistent legal hostility to punitive sanctions. (If it is hindered at all, it will be
hindered by legal rules that limit the ability of lenders to terminate relationships
in situations in which it appears that termination will impose substantial losses
on their borrowers. 96 )

Finally, because relational contracts almost by definition involve bilateral
arrangements, it often is feasible to structure an interlocking-bond arrangement
that constrains the lender from opportunistically executing on the bond. Venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs have one such arrangement. It seems well established that the commitment of the parties to that relationship allows each to
repose considerable trust in the statements of the other. The entrepreneur has an
incentive to act honestly, because the funds are provided to it in several stages
over a period of years; its misbehavior could lead to termination of funding and
probable failure of the enterprise.9 7 The venture capitalist's broad right to
remove management of the entrepreneur at any time serves as an additional

95. That assumes, of course, that the salvage value of those assets remains low by comparison to
their cost.
96. See, e.g., R. Wilson Freyermuth, Enforcement of Acceleration Provisions and the Rhetoric of
Good Faith, 1998 BYU L. REv. 1035, 1068-91 (analyzing cases that have imposed subjective
limitations on a creditor's right to accelerate). As I have stated before, the structural importance of
prompt termination mechanisms makes me deeply "skeptical of the propriety of recent litigation and
academic proposals to limit the ability of lenders to ...terminate their lending relationships." Mann,
Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 218.
97. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of CapitalMarkets:
Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 253 (1998) (discussing the importance of staged
investments to venture-capital structure); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of
Venture-CapitalOrganizations, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 473, 507 (1990) (explaining how staging investments
limits opportunistic conduct by entrepreneurs); Thomas Hellmann, Financial Structure and Control in
Venture Capital 14-16, 24-30, 37-38 (June 7, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(arguing that investments by venture capitalists need to be staged to ensure continued efforts by the
entrepreneur, and that debt from other lenders needs to be minimized to ensure that venture capitalist's
incentives are adequately aligned with the firm in which it invests).
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98
check against misbehavior.
But the relationship also includes structural protections against opportunism
by the venture capitalist. Most important, the venture capitalist is unlikely to
profit from the transaction, or even recover all of its investment, unless the
enterprise reaches a point at which it can issue publicly traded securities: It is
like an investment in railroad tracks, which has little value until the tracks reach
their destination. The venture capitalist has to keep funding, or it might lose its
entire investment. 99 As a result, the venture capitalist's incentives for fair
dealings with the entrepreneur are bolstered by the need to keep the company
going until it can make a successful initial public offering. 0 0
For obvious reasons, relational contracting works best in circumstances
involving long-term transactions between the same parties, such as employment
contracts or commerce in the production and distribution of assets.'.0 The
lengthy term of those arrangements lessens the costs the arrangements impose
in foregone flexibility, because of the greater likelihood that the relationship
will endure for a major portion of the useful life of the relation-specific assets.
That same characteristic, of course, tends to limit the types of transactions in
which relational assets can be used to verify information.
Mainstream long-term lending relationships present a challenging area for
relational theory. Although the role of relational concerns is difficult to assess,
they nevertheless seem to be significant in some contexts.' 0 2 As Bob Scott has
explained, commercial borrowers and lenders can gain considerably from an
arrangement in which one lender is the predominant lender to a borrower and
thus has the ability to impose significant costs on the borrower by withdrawing
03
from the relationship in response to misconduct by the borrower. 1
Scott and I do differ somewhat on how the relationship works. He focuses
more on the threat of loss-he characterizes the debtor as offering all of its
assets as a hostage-while I am more sanguine about the borrower's ability to

98. See Black & Gilson, supra note 97, at 253 (arguing that the venture capitalist's right to remove
management limits opportunism by the entrepreneur); Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control
Rights in Venture Capital Contracts 13-15 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (same).
99. See Black & Gilson, supra note 97, at 255-57.
100. See Smith, supra note 22, at 150-53 (explaining how contracts between entrepreneurs and
venture capitalists limit the potential for opportunistic conduct by venture capitalists).
101. As my colleague Scott Masten explains: "One of the most firmly established regularities in the
empirical literature on contracting is the association between relationship-specific investments (or
reliance) and the use and duration of contractual agreements." Scott Masten, Contractual Choice 13
(Aug. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (collecting studies).
102. See generally Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance:
The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, 22 J. BANKING & FIN.
613, 645-51 (1998) (analyzing the existing empirical evidence regarding the nature and significance of
relational considerations in commercial lending transactions).
103. See Scott, supra note 21, at 927-28. Mark Carey and his coauthors present empirical evidence
of multi-lender loans supervised by finance companies, with banks as more passive participants. They
argue persuasively that those arrangements suggest that loan contracts are influenced by relational
considerations rather than simply the cross-selling activity by banks that would support multi-lender
arrangements led by banks. See Carey et al., supra note 78, at 865-66.
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escape the relationship successfully. My differing perspective rests on a desire
not to overemphasize the extent to which termination by the existing lender will
harm the borrower; one of my prior studies indicates that even distressed
4
borrowers often find a new lender upon termination by their existing lender.'
Nevertheless, it seems clear that termination should impose at least three
kinds of costs on the borrower. First, the borrower will incur some out-ofpocket transaction costs in shifting its relationship from one lender to another.
Second, if the shift is motivated by a perception that the borrower is unreliable,
the shift often will move the borrower to a lender in a higher-risk category,
resulting in a higher interest rate for the borrower.10 5 Third, and most crucially,
the new lender is likely to charge substantially more than the existing lender
because of the relatively inferior state of the lender's knowledge about its new
borrower: a borrower always faces costs in starting over with a new lender
unfamiliar with the borrower's operations. Although those costs are difficult to
quantify, existing empirical studies put the interest-rate benefits of a lengthy
relationship in the range of one-twentieth of a percent per year, a substantial
amount. 106
C.

REPUTATION

In the third scenario, the borrower uses its reputation as a bond. Although
reputation is a wholly intangible asset, it nevertheless functions in much the
same way as the more tangible assets described in the preceding sections: if the
information provided by the borrower turns out to be false, the borrower can
suffer a significant harm through diminution of its reputation. For example, if a
reputable commercial real-estate developer transfers real estate with a representation regarding the quality of the construction, it will suffer a substantial loss to
its reputation if the representation turns out to be false. 10 7 The prospect of that
104. See Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 215-19. The deterrent effect of the threat of
termination also is mitigated by the possibility of renegotiation-the lender instead of terminating will
retain the borrower in its portfolio upon more onerous terms. That could reflect only an implicit
alteration of terms, such as a transfer of the relationship from the originating loan officer to a division
that handles problem loans, an action that at least implies less merciful treatment by the lender.
Alternatively, the renegotiation could occur more formally. See, e.g., id. at 196-98 (discussing a bank's
use of renegotiated increases in interest rates as a tool to motivate distressed borrowers).
105. See id. at 216-19.
106. See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small
Firm Finance, 68 J. Bus. 351, 369, 372-75 (1995) (presenting statistically significant data indicating
that a 10-year banking relationship would lower the cost of a firm's credit by 48 basis points); see also
John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam, 114
Q. J. EcON. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 10, on file with author) (presenting data from Vietnam
indicating that the willingness to offer trade credit increases with the length of the relationship); David
W. Blackwell & Drew B. Winters, Banking Relationships and the Effect of Monitoring on Loan Pricing
17-20 (Mar. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (presenting empirical evidence that
longer relationships lead to lower monitoring efforts and thus indirectly to lower interest rates).
107. Several of the papers in MASTEN CONTRACTING STUDIES, supra note 90, provide illuminating

examples of reputational sanctioning in context. See, e.g., Thomas M. Palay, Comparative Institutional
Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting, in MASTEN CONTRACTING STUDIES, supra
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ex post loss of reputation gives the representation considerable ex ante value.'I 8
Essentially, the willingness of the asserting party to put its reputation on the line
provides second-order information about the directly significant first-order information.
Numerous earlier scholars have recognized the existence of reputational
sanctioning.' 0 9 My goal here is to extend that literature in two ways: to broaden
it by situating reputational sanctions in the larger framework of devices discussed in this article and to give it context by analyzing the mechanisms by
which reputational sanctioning functions. As with the other mechanisms discussed in this article, the primary goal is to understand the situations in which
that mechanism is most likely to function successfully.
1. Reputation as a Bond
On the first point, two aspects of the structure of reputational sanctioning
suggest that it should work well to provide a bonding incentive to the borrower.
First of all, reputational sanctioning provides the punitive remedy described in
Part I. Because the process by which harm is inflicted on reputation-the
dissemination of adverse information-does not require recourse to a judicial
remedy, legal constraints on punitive penalties do not constrain the process.
Also, because the value of reputation is not limited by the amount at stake in the
transaction, it is easy to see that the harm from loss of reputation could exceed
significantly the funds at stake in the underlying transaction.
note 90, at 52-55 (describing reputational constraints in arrangements between shippers and owners of
railroad freight cars); Edward C. Gallick, Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration:The Efficiency of
Contracts in the Tuna Industry, in MASTEN CONTRACTING STUDIES, supra note 90, at 203, 211-15
(analyzing reputational constraints on opportunistic behavior by tuna processors). For some particularly
persuasive examples from environments in which legal sanctions are effectively nonexistent, see Janet
T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An InstitutionalAlternative to
Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 355-57 (1981) (discussing the reputational sanctions among
members of Chinese clan groups serving as middlemen in southeast Asia); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Networks, Trust, and Search in Vietnam's Emerging Private Sector 13-14 (Mar. 9,
1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the importance of reputational sanctions in Vietnam).
108. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, 4 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 33, 44 (1988) (arguing
that "the propensity for opportunistic behavior is usually effectively checked by the need to take
account of the effect of the firm's actions on future business"). Indeed, Coase generally believes that
reputational sanctioning is so effective as to obviate the need for the kinds of asset specificity postulated
by the theory of relational contracting. See id. at 44-46.
109. The general idea is not new, as I noted in my preliminary analysis of the topic in Mann, The
Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 673-74. I have found the most useful prior work in the area
to be Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely
Repeated Credit Market Game, 35 INT'L EcON. REv. 899, 904-14 (1994) (showing through a formal
model how reputational lending can limit the borrower's ability to export risk to the lender by
smoothing out profits and losses); Chamy, supra note 15, at 391-408 (offering a tripartite typology of
nonlegal sanctions and explaining the circumstances in which they are more effective than legal
sanctions); Douglas W. Diamond, Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, 97 J. POL. ECON. 828 (1989)
(providing a formal model of how borrowers acquire reputation to improve the loan contracts that
lenders will offer to them); Kornhauser, supra note 4 (providing a formal model of reputation as a
substitute for legal remedies).
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The second feature that makes reputational sanctioning an attractive contracting mechanism arises from the nature of the asset that is posted. Unlike the
institutions discussed above, reputational sanctioning does not directly undermine the effectiveness of the borrower's use of productive assets. Recall that
transactions involving collateral can require the borrower to place assets in the
control of the lender, thus removing them from productive use by the borrower.
Similarly, relational contracting can require the borrower to invest in relationspecific assets that might have a lower salvage value than other similarly
productive assets. Reputational sanctioning, by contrast, does not require any
such misallocation of productive assets. Indeed, because reputation has something of a public-good character-the borrower can post it in several places at
the same time without dilution-it costs little or nothing for the borrower to
post a reputational bond.
Of course, a system of reputational sanctioning could cause losses by inducing borrowers to invest more in the building of their reputation-by advertisement and the like-than they otherwise would. ° The benefit of reputational
sanctioning, however, is that no such investment is required. Indeed, it is
doubtful in this context that such an investment would be useful; I rather doubt
that lenders will be persuaded of the creditworthiness of borrowers by advertisements that are not accompanied by objective evidence of behavior commonly
associated with creditworthiness.
2. When Is Reputational Sanctioning Effective?
The next problem is to consider the circumstances in which reputational
sanctioning will be effective. Working from the idea that reputational sanctioning works best when it provides the kind of punitive sanction discussed above,
two factors should dictate the efficacy of a reputation-bond arrangement: the
value of the reputation to the borrower and the costs that the lender incurs in
assessing the borrower's reputation.
The most general point to make about a reputational bond is that for several
reasons its value is related to the size of the business to which it attaches. First,
the value of the reputation generally is limited by the size of the business, or at
most by the value of the potential businesses that the entrepreneur could expect
to build if the entrepreneur's reputation remained intact. Accordingly, all things
being equal, reputational constraints provide support of a greater absolute value
for large firms than they do for small firms. That is not to say that reputation
cannot be central to the success of smaller firms; it is easy to imagine a small
business that has few substantial assets other than its reputation. For such a
business, the reputation might have a larger relative value than it would for a
110. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 619 (discussing investment by sellers in "brand name
or reputation as a means of signaling the quality of [their] information"); Benjamin Klein & Keith B.
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 626-27
(1981) (modeling the relation between investments in brand name and reliability of quality assurances
by producers).
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typical business much larger in size."' But notwithstanding that large relative
value, the limited absolute value of the small business's reputation should limit
the size of the transactions for which that reputation can provide credible
support.
Apart from the size of the business, the value of the reputation also depends
on the nature of the borrower's business, and in particular on the extent to
which the borrower frequently engages in transactions for which its reputation
is crucial. That is the familiar "return-to-the-market" point.' 12 If the borrower is
a repeat player that relies on its reputation frequently-such as a large company
that issues commercial paper almost every day 13 -then its reputation is particularly valuable because a loss of reputation will harm the borrower swiftly and
surely.' "4 Conversely, if the borrower could continue its business without
reputation-dependent transactions, then a loss of reputation would be less costly
to the borrower, a feature that limits the value of the reputational bond such a
party can post." 5 That should not be a problem in the credit markets on which I
focus here, because most borrowers are likely to believe that they will need to
return to those markets with considerable frequency.
As a related point, the identity of the buyer is part of the calculus of whether
transactions are reputation-dependent: large commercial entities are much more
likely than consumers to use specialized purchasing agents sensitive to reputational information about the seller. 1 6 Thus, reputational sanctions generally will
be more effective in transactions involving acquisitions by sophisticated parties. 117

111. Thus, in some contexts small size can enhance the value of the reputation, because loss of the
business opportunity in question would be devastating to the borrower. Merritt Fox identifies such a
phenomenon for proponents of new inventions in the semi-conductor industry. See MERRITr B. Fox,
FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 114

(1987).
112. See Chamy, supra note 15, at 414-15; Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at
673-74. For an earlier and less generalized discussion, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 620
(explaining how the "repeat player" status of investment bankers limits "final period" problems that
"dampen" the value of investments in reputation).
113. See Mann, Searchingfor Negotiability, supra note 6, at 984-85 (discussing the modem process
for the issuance of commercial paper).
114. See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 90, at 96-97 (explaining that reputation is particularly important in cases where sellers expect to engage in future transactions with their buyers); G. Richard Shell,
Opportunismand Trust in the Negotiation of CommercialContracts: Towarda New Cause ofAction, 44
VAND. L. REV. 221, 268-69 (1991) (explaining how "[p]arties in one-time transactions.., have limited
reputational concerns toward the other party because the parties contemplate no future business
dealings").
115. See POSNER, supra note 34, § 4.1, at 91; Klein & Leffler, supra note 110, at 617 (using a formal
model to show that reputational sanctioning works "only if firms are earning a continual stream of
rental income that will be lost if" the firm engages in deceptive conduct).
116. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 396-97 (1985).

117. That is not to say that reputational sanctions have no force in transactions involving unsophisticated individuals. For example, as Mark Gergen has pointed out to me, reputational sanctions from
institutional stockholders might constrain large companies from opportunistic reductions of dividend
payouts that otherwise might harm small individual stockholders.
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The second factor-the costs that the lender incurs in ascertaining the
reputation of the borrower-is considerably more complicated. Three distinct
elements are important. The first is size. Because larger entities tend to engage
in larger transactions, and because the costs of assessing an entity's reputation
should be largely independent of size, the proportionate costs of assessing
reputation should grow smaller as the size of the entity and the transaction in
question increase. Thus, as a practical matter, it should be relatively less
expensive to assess reputation for larger companies.
A second element is the difficulty of discovering the events that have
occurred. A reliable mechanism for disseminating reports of reputation-relevant
events makes it cheaper for lenders to be sure that they have all of the potential
events before them when they evaluate the reputation of the borrower." 8 Thus,
for example, reputational sanctions against Japanese borrowers are particularly
powerful because of a formal mechanism that obligates all banks to provide
prompt public notice to a central clearinghouse when any commercial borrower
fails to make a scheduled payment on a promissory note.1" 9 As with some of the
earlier factors, that factor indirectly creates a tendency toward larger transactions, because the costs of disseminating and acquiring information will be
20
relatively lower for larger transactions than they are for smaller transactions.'
The third element that affects the cost of assessing reputation is the objectivity of the reputation-relevant events. If a false assertion by the borrower is clear
and indisputable-the borrower failed to honor a letter of credit that it had
issued-then a reputation-damaging event is easier to identify than it would be
21
if it is difficult to distinguish between false assertions and true assertions.
Thus, reputational sanctioning will work best in transactions for which the
parties can establish objective circumstances that are the focal points around
which satisfactory performance is assessed.' 2 2 To the extent that the parties are

118. See Charny, supra note 15, at 418-19; Muris, supra note 22, at 527 ("[R]eputation provides
little deterrent when potential opportunists can conceal their actions from those with whom they expect
to contract."); Shell, supra note 114, at 269-70.
119. See Toshihiro Matsumura & Marc Ryser, Revelation of Private Information About Unpaid
Notes in the Trade Credit Bill System in Japan, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1995). I thank Mark West for
calling this reference to my attention.
120. See Letsou, supra note 27, at 596 (arguing that reputational bonds will be less valuable for
consumers because of the limited incentive to gather information about consumers). That point can be
overstated, because merchants in some contexts do develop systems for disseminating reputational
information even for relatively small transactions. See, e.g., John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff,
Dispute Prevention Without Courts in Vietnam 16-17 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (discussing meetings of Vietnamese merchants designed to disseminate information about the
reliability of their customers). Moreover, advances in information technology, of course, can offset that
problem. See, e.g., Rafe Needleman, Why eBay Works and Why Other Auction Sites May Work Even
Better, RED HERRING, Jan. 1999, at 118, 118 (explaining how eBay provides reputational information
about parties who provide objects for sale in on-line auctions by providing hypertext links from each
seller to the comments of previous purchasers from that seller).
121. See Shell, supra note 114, at 270 (noting the problems with reputational sanctions in circumstances in which "reputational facts, if known, are subject to multiple interpretations").
122. That appears to be the case in commercial lending transactions. As my prior case studies have
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unable to create such objective reference points, the lawsuit can provide a
reasonably effective substitute: a judgment against the borrower provides relatively objective evidence of a negative reputation-relevant event. 123
A final point relates the costs of assessment back to the value of the
underlying bond. Factors that make it easy to assess reputation do more than
lower the costs of evaluating the status of the bond at any time. They also have
a second, ex ante effect. If the borrower knows before the transaction that its
reputation can be evaluated cheaply and accurately at any given time, the
borrower knows that it is sure to suffer in the future if information that it has
provided turns out to be false. And if the lender knows (as it should) that the
borrower is aware of that problem, then the lender should place more reliance
on the bond. Essentially, ease of enforcement of reputational sanctions lowers
124
the slippage costs that can hinder the effectiveness of bonds in other areas.
III.

VERIFICATION BY THIRD PARTIES

As the discussion in Part II suggests, a variety of constraints often make it
impractical for parties to use any of the mechanisms described above to verify
borrowers' assertions. None of those mechanisms provides a general solution
for information problems. Rather, as Part II explains, the effectiveness of each
depends on a particular set of transactional circumstances.
With respect to the collateral-related practices discussed in Part IIA, the
borrower might not have assets adequate to post a pledge that would satisfy the
lender. Alternatively, the opportunity cost of posting such assets might exceed
the gains from verification (that is, the higher price that the lender would pay to

enhance its ability to distinguish between true and false information). Similarly,
the relational-asset solution described in Part 1IB is not suited for the frequent
one-shot transactions that characterize the mass market; it has value only in

contexts that involve a protracted and mutually beneficial interaction between
the lender and the borrower. Finally, as suggested in Part IIc2, reputational
bonds will not be a useful solution for many businesses: their reputations might
not be important to continued successful operations, it might be difficult for

suggested, sophisticated parties are relatively unlikely to rely on breaches of vague or subjective
covenants, and much more likely to focus on defaults with respect to clear and objectively verifiable
obligations. Thus, although the dominant concern motivating lenders to terminate relationships generally would be a subjective concern about the borrower's long-term financial strength, lenders almost
invariably took action only in response to an objective problem such as a specific payment default. See
Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 174-75 (finance company), 188 (bank), 202-03 (insurance
company).
123. See Jonathan Karpoff & John Lott, Jr., Punitive Damages: Theory and Evidence (1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (presenting empirical evidence indicating that punitivedamage awards against publicly traded companies have an adverse reputational effect that lowers the
value of the company by an amount significantly larger than the nominal size of the award).
124. See, e.g., Mann, Temporal Priority,supra note 6, at 34-35 n.85 (discussing the difficulties of
enforcing surety bonds issued in the construction-loan context).
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lenders to verify their reputations, or lenders might doubt the likelihood that
adverse actions would harm the borrowers' reputation.
Another more general possibility noted in Part Ic is that the borrower either
will not behave with complete rationality, or (a more intractable problem) that
the lender will not be able to trust the borrower to behave with complete
rationality. Because the bonding mechanisms depend on the likelihood that the
incentives that they create will provide effective constraints on the conduct of
the borrower, those institutions can be effective only if the lender expects the
borrower to respond to the incentives. In many cases, however, the lender
cannot expect consistently rational responses. For example, building on work by
Bob Scott, I have argued in a previous article that borrowers and lenders in the
consumer credit market often fail to reach negotiated solutions because of the
lender's lack of certainty about the rationality of its borrowers. 125 Therefore, the
ability of the parties to implement the mechanisms outlined above will be
limited in cases where the borrower is not conspicuously rational.
In this part, I consider a common solution for situations in which it is difficult
for the borrower itself to solve the information-based concerns of the lender:
use of a third party to verify the information. For ease of illustration, I
distinguish two general ways in which the third party can verify the borrower's
assertions: by offering a financial commitment that would compensate the
lender upon falsehood (a guaranty or suretyship arrangement) or by directly
asserting the truth of the borrower's assertions.
A. VERIFICATION BY FINANCIAL COMMITMENT (GUARANTIES AND SURETIES)'

26

In the most well-known third-party solution in financing transactions, the
borrower induces a third party to offer its own financial strength to verify the
borrower's commitments. The simplest example is a classic surety-bond transaction, in which a bonding company' posts assets on behalf of the borrower.
Although the transaction at first glance might seem closely analogous to the

125. The problem is that it arguably is not cost-effective for lenders to consumers to engage in
case-by-case renegotiation of defaulted loans with borrowers, given the limited likelihood that consumer borrowers will both understand the ramifications of the situation that confronts them and respond
.rationally to that situation. Thus, a rational lender might adopt a single onerous response to defaulting
consumer borrowers and use that plan automatically in all cases, without regard to the possibility of
profitable renegotiation in particular cases. See Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 227-32
(explaining why a harsh stance against default might be preferable to case-by-case assessment)
(discussing Scott, supra note 25, at 746-51).
126. I do not intend to suggest any legal consequence in the distinction between sureties and
guarantors. Under modem law, those differences have only limited practical significance. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SuRETYsHIp & GuARANTY § 1 (reporter's note to cmt. c) (1996) ("The
distinction, if any, between sureties and guarantors has been the subject of long-lasting debate. For
purposes of rights provided by suretyship law, rather than by contract, the two mechanisms are, indeed,
identical.") (citations omitted). I try to use whichever of the two terms is most commonly used to
describe the transaction in question, with guaranties being used more commonly in purely financial
contracts and suretyship being used more commonly in transactions involving some form of performance other than payment.
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direct pledge arrangement discussed above, the use of a third party changes the
dynamics of the transaction in important ways.
The first is a clear advantage: unlike a classic pledge, a surety-bond transaction usually does not remove assets from productive use. Although in common
parlance the surety has "posted a bond," the surety has not actually "posted"
any assets with the lender; it has simply exposed itself to legal liability. As
discussed in Part IIA4, exposure to a false-statement lawsuit can be viewed as a
special type of pledge. 27 The key difference between the classic surety transaction and the classic secured transaction is that the surety transaction can proceed
without the borrower or the surety removing any assets from productive use.
For reasons that will be discussed below, it is possible that the parties might
choose to verify the surety transaction itself by a grant of collateral-for
example, in the case of a secured guaranty-but that is not necessary for the
transaction to work.
In addition, the surety transaction creates a second occasion for information
verification. If the lender wants to rely on the surety to address its concerns
about the borrower, the lender needs to evaluate the likelihood that the surety
will comply with the surety's obligation. And for that task, the lender is likely to
use the direct two-party institutions described in Part II. Thus, for example, a
surety that is in business to provide such assurances (as a bonding company, for
example) might use its reputation to assuage the concerns of the lender.
In other contexts, the surety will be less dependent on its reputation: consider
the entrepreneur that guaranties the obligation of a small business that it owns.
If the guarantied business is the principal enterprise of the entrepreneur, the loss
of reputation from failure to perform on the guaranty might seem to the lender
inadequate to assure performance.1 28 In such a case, the lender might choose to
rely on another method of assuring performance, such as a grant of collateral or
even the possibility of a lawsuit to enforce the obligation. But whatever device
the parties select, the key structural point is that the lender cannot plausibly rely
on the surety's reliability as a substitute for the borrower's without some
assurance of the surety's reliability.
Implicit in the previous paragraph is an assumption that the arrangement
satisfies the lender by causing the lender to put faith in the surety directly, not
by indirectly enhancing the lender's faith in the borrower. The surety transaction
has only a limited potential for verifying the first-order information to the
lender. By hypothesis, the surety is not directly asserting the truth of the
information; 29 it is agreeing merely to indemnify the lender if the information
turns out to be false. In a typical insurance transaction, for example, the surety
does not promise that there will be no fires; it compensates for the fires that
127. See discussion supra Part IJA4.
128. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (explaining how reputational bonds are more
valuable when the party whose reputation is at stake frequently returns to the market).
129. For discussion of transactions in which the third party directly asserts the truth of the
borrower's assertions, see infra Part IHIB.
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occur. Similarly in the financial context, the guarantor does not promise that
there will be no defaults; it simply agrees to make the promised stream of
payments if the primary obligor fails to perform as agreed.
Although that distinction might seem trivial at first, it poses the central
difficulty with the arrangement. If the guaranty tells the lender nothing about the
truth of the first-order information, it only substitutes the surety's assertions for
those of the lender. Except in the case in which the surety is better placed to
provide verification of its assertions than the borrower (because of the surety's
reputation, for example), that substitution of assertion may do little to assuage
the concerns of the lender. Thus, although the lender has obtained a right to sue
the surety in the event of falsehood, such a legal right will solve the lender's
problem only if that legal right by itself is adequate to verify the surety's
assertions.
For a variety of reasons that parallel the problems that make litigation
generally problematic as a mechanism for verifying information, 130 that often
will not be true. Consider, among other things, the out-of-pocket costs of
enforcing the bond, the surety's ability to interpose technical defenses to
enforcement, the likelihood that the nominal amount of the bond will be less
than the lender's loss, and the difficulty of ascertaining and proving that a
falsehood has occurred. 1 3 1 Thus, notwithstanding the right of the lender to
pursue the surety, the lender is likely to retain a substantial independent interest
in verifying the underlying first-order information.
Hence, in situations in which the guaranty's assertion is inadequately verified,
a guaranty arrangement works best when something about the arrangement also
increases the confidence of the lender in the underlying, first-order assertion of
the borrower. If the surety is acting rationally, then its willingness to accept an
obligation to pay the lender upon falsehood should rest on some cost saving
from the arrangement. And if the surety cannot provide some improved verification at a cost to the borrower lower than the amount by which the surety's
to the lender, the arrangement is irrational from
commitment lowers the costs
32
the borrower's perspective. 1
The surety can provide that cost saving in two general ways. One possibility
is that the surety would have a greater tolerance for the risk of falsehood than
the lender. Arguably, the business of the professional surety rests on its ability to
aggregate and diversify a large number of risks. But that explanation cannot
solve the problem at hand, because many of the lenders in question are likely 1to
33
be large and sophisticated companies fully capable of diversifying risks.

130. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92 (explaining the ineffectiveness of litigation to assure
performance).
131. See Mann, Temporal Priority, supra note 6, at 34-35 n.85 (discussing the difficulties of
enforcing surety bonds issued in the construction-loan context).
132. For a formal explication of that point, see Avery W. Katz, An Economic Analysis of the
GuarantyContract, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 68-74 (1999).
133. It underscores the limited explanatory power of the risk-bearing thesis that life-insurance
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More important, when the surety's role is limited to bearing the risk of loss, the
surety provides no independent verification to the lender of the underlying
first-order information in which the lender is interested. Thus, the lender still
must worry about both the accuracy of the borrower's information and the
reliability of the surety's verification.
In many contexts, however, sureties appear to provide a second service in
addition to risk-bearing. Specifically, sureties often can provide a superior
verification institution that gives the lender a better assurance regarding the
first-order information than either a simple assertion from the borrower or any
other mechanism that the lender could implement directly with the borrower. In
many cases, that superior verification institution might be something quite
simple, such as effective control of the borrower (in the case where the
guarantor is an individual or entity closely related to the borrower). Slightly less
definitive but still quite effective would be cases in which a personal relationship between the borrower and the guarantor is sufficient to give the borrower a
strong incentive to comply to prevent the adverse effects on the guarantor that
would occur from a breach by the borrower. 134 Similarly, anecdotal evidence
suggests that construction lenders rely on bonds more for their informational
content than the legal recourse that they provide. The typical construction
lender (properly) views its legal recourse on the bond as having little value. But
the bonding company's expertise at assessing the skill, probity, and creditworthiness of the contractor provides substantial verification of those matters to the
construction lender, even though the surety makes no direct representations
1 35
regarding those matters.
A similar effect appears in the context of relational guaranties and standby
letters of credit.' 36 With respect to guaranties, the lender obtains a financial
commitment from a party that has a strong relation with the borrower. Whatever
the value of the legal recourse of that commitment, 137 the overall value of the
commitment to the lender is buttressed by the likelihood that the guarantor (or
issuer of the letter of credit) is better placed than the lender to verify or assure

companies-the consummate risk diversifiers-are among the largest lenders (and most frequent
seekers of guaranties) in our economy.
134. Cf Jason DeParle, As Welfare Rolls Shrink, Load on Relatives Grows, N.Y. TtMEs, Feb. 21,
1999, § 1, at 1 (discussing the costs imposed on older generations when they have to care for the
children of younger relatives who engage in criminal activity).
135. See Interview with Harry C. Mueller, Senior Vice President, Mercantile Bank of St. Louis,
N.A., in St. Louis, Mo. (Dec. 11, 1995) (transcript on file with author) (discussing the reasons that
construction lenders require their borrowers to obtain bonds); see also Mann, Temporal Priority,supra
note 6, at 34-35 (general discussion of surety bonds issued in the construction-loan context).
136. Although formally distinct, a standby letter of credit is functionally quite similar to a guaranty,
with the main difference being the limited defenses available to the issuer of the standby letter of credit.
For a general discussion highlighting the similarities, see MANN, supra note 6, at 372-87.
137. The value of the legal recourse can vary substantially. As a general matter, the letter of credit
probably is quite valuable, if only because of the reputational harm to an issuer from failing to honor
one. Guaranties, on the other hand, might be considerably less valuable, except in cases in which the
guarantor is quite large and established, and thus dependent on a reputation for financial responsibility.
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the truth of the first-order information. For example, in the ordinary arrange138
ment the guarantor is a controlling officer or shareholder of the borrower.
Hence, the guarantor has the ability to control the borrower directly and thus
ensure that the borrower conducts itself as promised.
The effect of a standby letter of credit is somewhat less direct, but similar.
Such a commitment ordinarily is issued by the primary lender to the borrower.' 39 The bank issuing the letter of credit might have a superior ability to
verify the truthfulness of the borrower's assertions because of knowledge
acquired during its previous relations with the borrower. Less benignly, the
issuer of the letter of credit may have the ability (using relational assets along
the lines discussed above) 140 to cause the borrower considerable harm if the
borrower commits an act that causes the issuer to become obligated to the
lender on the letter of credit. Most obviously, the issuer might be able to harm
the borrower by terminating all of the issuer's financing arrangements with the
borrower.'11 That power to punish makes the issuer a more effective enforcer,
and thus better placed to verify than the nonrelational lender. But whatever the
mechanism on .which the issuer relies, the lender that receives a standby letter of
credit can take some comfort in the knowledge that the issuing bank has taken
some steps to assure itself that its likely exposure on the letter of credit is
relatively low. And the existence of those steps gives the lender an independent
verification of the truth of the first-order information that is driving the entire
arrangement.
One final surety arrangement worthy of mention is title insurance. That
industry is peculiar, because it presents a rare case in which parties use a surety
relationship to verify statements about historical facts (facts that determine
whether the borrower has clear title to specified real estate).1 42 In all of the other

138. See, e.g., Mann, Small-Business Lending, supra note 6, at 23 (providing anecdotal evidence of
the typical relation between a guarantor and its primary obligor).
139. See MANN, supra note 6, at 374 (discussing the reasons for the typical relations between an
obligor and the issuer of a standby letter of credit).
140. See supra Part IIB.
141. See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text (discussing the dynamics of relational lending
transactions).
142. A structurally similar phenomenon is the liability of a securities underwriter for a false
statement in a prospectus, which supports the factual assertions of the issuer of the securities described
in the prospectus. See Fox, supra note 111, at 347, 366 (discussing the in terrorem effect of Section 11
liability under the securities laws). In that context, however, liability rests on a vague legal standard,
and thus is relatively unreliable as a verification institution and yet relatively risky for the underwriter.
See id. at 346-47 (referring to problems with vague standard of proof). But cf. Kraakman, supra note
90, at 82-83 (stating that the underwriting community has developed sufficiently specific procedures to
protect against the potentially "crippling risk-bearing costs" imposed by Section 11).
The problem is exacerbated because the party with the ability to impose liability-the individual
lender (or, more cynically, the lawyer seeking a token plaintiff for a class action)-might have little or
no reputational impetus to refrain from pressing a frivolous lawsuit. See Choi, supra note 4, at 948
(discussing the problems frivolous securities lawsuits pose for a gatekeeper regime); Shell, supra note
114, at 271-72 (discussing the possibility that adding a cause of action for opportunism by one
contracting party for wrongful termination of pre-contractual negotiations will lead to opportunistic

1999]

VERIFICATION INSTITUTIONS IN FINANCING TRANSACTIONS

2263

arrangements discussed above, parties use guaranties and suretyship arrangements to assure the truth of forecasts. Although I cannot explain why such
arrangements are not used more often to verify factual assertions, it is easy to
see why suretyship arrangements are valuable in the title-insurance context. For
one thing, the legal mechanisms for enforcing responsibility for false title
assertions by borrowers (suits for breach of title warranties in deeds) are
notoriously ineffective.143 In addition, the title company's expertise gives it a
superior ability to evaluate the truth of the statements of the borrower. Thus, the
lender accurately perceives that the title company's willingness to issue a policy
carries with it an implicit assertion regarding the state of title that is more
reliable than any explicit assertion the lender might obtain from the borrower.
That is particularly true given the difficulties that even an honest and diligent
seller would have in ascertaining the state of its title to the land in question.
Moreover, because the title-insurance company is a repeat player whose profitability depends on a reputation for performance of its commitments, the assurance of that company typically would be much more valuable than the assurance
of a seller much more likely to be a one-shot player.' 44 Hence, reliance on the
title company's assertion mitigates the inherent unreliability of the borrower's
assertion.
B.

VERIFICATION BY ASSERTION

A more direct way for a third party to verify the borrower's assertion is for
the third party to adopt the borrower's assertion and obtain an independent
assessment of the truth of the borrower's statement. That arrangement works
when the lender has a better way to verify the second-order information
provided by the third party than it does to verify the uncertain first-order
information provided by the borrower. Essentially, that arrangement provides a
mechanism for collecting, evaluating, and verifying what otherwise would be
relatively anonymous information about the reputation of the borrower. Thus,

lawsuits by the other). That distinguishes the situation from the more common and effective situations
of interlocking bonds where the party holding the vague enforcement mechanism, such as a lender, is
constrained by reputational sanctions from opportunistic exercise of that mechanism. See supra note 22
and accompanying text (describing interlocking-bonds arrangement).
Of course, the fact that Section 11 is not perfect does not prove it is a bad idea. As Reinier Kraakman
has shown, it is not clear that reputation works perfectly in the market for provision of information by
underwriters. Thus, it is at least possible that Section 11 functions as a value-increasing supplement to
reputational sanctioning. See Kraakman, supra note 90, at 96-100; see also Choi, supra note 4, at
958-59 (recommending the limitation of antifraud liability to enhance the functioning of the private
gatekeeper regime).
143. Among the difficulties are (1) the warranties that apply in such cases are not breached by many
of the most damaging types of misrepresentation; and (2) the damages available for breaches are in an
amount that often would not be close to fully compensatory. See, e.g., GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 194-207 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing the
difficulties of enforcing warranties in deeds).
144. I thank David Skeel for that point.
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institutions implementing that arrangement tend to operate as a supplement to
reputational sanctioning against the borrower.
For illustrative purposes, I distinguish three situations that each use a different mechanism for verifying the second-order assertion of the third party: (1)
the assertion is provided without monetary compensation; (2) the assertion is
provided by an independent third party in return for monetary compensation
from the lender (an information merchant); or (3) the assertion is provided by a
third party that contracts with the borrower (an information intermediary).
1. Free Information (Word of Mouth)
The first is the simplest: the assertions are verified by a third party that
operates without monetary compensation or contractual arrangement, essentially by what we would call word-of-mouth advertising. The most obvious
problem with that solution is the question of what verifying institution will
function between the third party and the lender. The answer is that the verifying
institution often is nothing more than unadulterated trust. Thus, that solution
tends to work best when the lender and the third party have a personal
that extends beyond the transaction for which verification is rerelationship
145
quired.
For example, in many contexts it would be common for us to choose from
among competing products or services by asking for recommendations from our
friends or acquaintances. I myself have used that practice frequently in selecting
physicians or veterinarians. Because of the relatively random 1 46 selection process of persons from whom I inquire (the limited universe of my friends),
together with the bonds of47friendship, information obtained by that route tends
to be relatively unbiased.'
On the other hand, because the information is free, it might tend to have a
value approximating its cost. Freely provided information can be expected to
represent the honest opinion of the person providing it, and to reflect that
person's anecdotal experience, but it is not likely to reflect the results of the
detailed inquiry and analysis that could be provided through the mechanisms
discussed below, in which businesses gather and provide information for profit.
Thus, it might more frequently be erroneous or incomplete in significant
respects.
The limitations discussed above suggest that word-of-mouth advertising should
145. As the sociologists would put it, trust is a function of "embeddedness." See, e.g., Mark
Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc.
481,490 (1985) (discussing reasons why information from a trusted informant is more reliable).
146. They are random only in the sense that it is unlikely that they will provide generally
self-serving recommendations, a feature that makes them superior to some of the alternative mechanisms discussed below. They are not random in the sense that they are likely to provide information
about a random subset of the potential service providers. My close friends, for example, might be
limited to a particular social milieu that would limit the likelihood that they would be familiar with
potential service providers outside that milieu.
147. See Granovetter, supra note 145, at 490.
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have a limited role in financing transactions. Somewhat surprisingly, however, it
seems to play a major role in some important economic sectors, apparently
because of the superior ability of that institution to provide unbiased information. Take, for instance, the practice of so-called "angel" investing in
venture-capital companies. Angel investing provides an alternative to the more
well-known venture-capital investments used to fund high-risk startup companies, especially in technology areas. 148 Although not well known or extensively
studied, the amount of funds involved is impressive; a conservative estimate
suggests that angels disburse billions of dollars each year to thousands of
14 9
firms.
The typical angel investor is an individual who has become wealthy
through previous activity as an entrepreneur supported by venture-capital investment.150 The most significant difference between the two is that the angel
investor ordinarily maintains less rigorously adversarial relations with the entre5
preneur. 1'
The reason for the differing tone of the arrangements is clear from the work
of George Fenn and his coauthors. 5 2 They have presented persuasive empirical
evidence indicating that much of angel investing is directed based on word-ofmouth recommendation by close acquaintances. 153 Because the relevant community is concentrated in a relatively small number of people, word-of-mouth
recommendations can provide an unbiased assessment of the caliber of a
substantial portion of the many potential borrowers seeking funds. 1 54 As the
example of angel investing demonstrates, word-of-mouth advertising can promote investments of a considerable magnitude in an important sector of the
economy. Moreover, George Fenn's results suggest that angel investing extends
148. See George W. Fenn et al., The Role of Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists in Financing
High-Tech Start-Ups 11-13 (Dec. 3, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (presenting
evidence regarding the relative incidence of angel and venture-capital investors).
149. See id. at 5; Stephen Prowse, Angel Investors and the Market for Angel Investments, 22 J.
BANKING & FIN. 785, 785-91 (1998) (general discussion of angel investments); Mary Beth Grover,
Starting a Company Is Like Going to War, FORBES, Nov. 2, 1998, at 184 (reporting an estimate that
angels invested $10 billion during 1997); Harvard Business School, The Band of Angels (Case No.
N9-898-188) (Mar. 11, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)(detailed description of a
large group of angel investors in Silicon Valley).
150. See Fenn et al., supra note 148, at 5-6.
151. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1752
(1994) (reporting that "fear of investor expropriation of gain makes [entrepreneurs] suspicious of
venture capitalists"); Fenn et al., supra note 148, at 6-7 (discussing the relatively beneficent attitude of
angel investors); Utset, supra note 52, at 4-5 (same). For a general discussion of the "high-powered"
incentives that venture capitalists customarily impose on those in whom they invest, see id. at 21-39.
152. See Fenn et al., supra note 148.
153. See id. at6.
154. Contrary to my expectations, it appears that angel investors are more successful at evaluating
investments that are geographically dispersed than venture capitalists. Thus, angel investments appear
to be much less concentrated in California than venture-capital investments. See id. at 16; see also Josh
Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms, 50 J. FIN. 301, 312-15 (1995)
(presenting empirical evidence of a statistically significant relationship between the likelihood of a
venture capitalist sitting on the board of a firm and the distance between the firm's location and the
venture capitalist's headquarters).
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the range of fundable innovations by permitting investments55 in smaller and
younger companies that would not interest venture capitalists.
Another interesting example comes from the recent work of John McMillan
and Christopher Woodruff on financing transactions in Vietnam.' 56 Their work
is fascinating, because it analyzes the institutions that businesses develop for
contracting in an economy devoid of any reliable mechanism for legal enforcement.' 57 In the absence of any realistic possibility of legal enforcement, the
drive for profit has created a laboratory for privately created contractual institutions.
One central institution that McMillan and Woodruff highlight is a form of
word-of-mouth information collection. Like the angel investors described above,
Vietnam merchants rely heavily on "family ties" and previous business dealings as "sources of information that could facilitate initial exchanges."' 5 8 But
those merchants also rely heavily on information-sharing with other merchants,
essentially a formalized gossip system. As McMillan and Woodruff explain,
"producers of similar goods who are located close to each other continually
meet for gossip, and they report that their most frequent topic of conversation is
suppliers and customers (ahead of technology, product design, government
regulations, and pricing)." 1 59 Although the authors do not discuss the point
expressly, parties apparently have an incentive to provide truthful information
because the information exchanges are mutual. In any event, their data indicate
that merchants view the information as sufficiently reliable to determine not
only the parties with whom to do business, but also such important
aspects of
60
the relationship as the amount of trade credit to be extended.'
155. See Fenn et al., supra note 148, at 15, 20-21. As Josh Lerner has pointed out to me, the
evidence of those more "diverse" investments is scant. Thus, I must acknowledge some doubt about
the reliability of the point suggested in the text.
156. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 106; McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 107.
157. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 106, at 2 (reporting results of survey indicating that less
than 10% of Vietnamese firms thought that the judicial system could enforce contracts); McMillan &
Woodruff, supra note 107, at 2, 4, 12 (same).
158. McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 107, at 8 (reporting results of survey indicating that 23% of
the managers of customers and 46% of the managers of suppliers were either "family members or
friends" or "previous business acquaintances").
159. See id. at 10, 11 (reporting results of survey indicating that 17% of customer relationships and
42% of supplier relationships were initiated based on information from other producers); McMillan &
Woodruff, supra note 120, at 18-22 (further discussing that point). Janet Landa speculates about a
similar mechanism for evaluating the reliability of outsiders in her work on Chinese middlemen groups,
but she apparently collected no evidence about such practices. See Landa, supra note 107, at 359-60.
160. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 106, at 11-12, 18-19 (reporting statistically significant
relationship between participation in "gossip" network by the potential lender and the amount of credit
granted and received by manufacturer); id. at 18 (reporting statistically significant relationship between
family relationship with supplier and the willingness of the supplier to grant credit); McMillan &
Woodruff, supra note 107, at 8-9 (reporting statistically significant relationship between the frequency
with which credit is offered to customers at the first transaction and the existence of a personal
relationship with the customer that predates that transaction). Trade credit is particularly important
because of the relatively limited availability of institutional lending in Vietnam. See id. at 12 (reporting
results of survey indicating that only 20% of firms received bank financing).
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The arrangement obviously has limitations. Among other things, it allows
merchants to obtain information only about those who have contracted with
others whom the merchant can approach for information.' 6 ' Nevertheless, it
remains surprisingly effective, emblematic of the potential for private institutions unsupported by formal legal sanctions.
2. Information Merchants
The second common institution is for a third party, unrelated to the borrower,
to collect the information and sell it to the lender. That is the model commonly
used by businesses such as check-verification services and investment newsletters. In that scenario, reputational constraints readily bolster the reliability of the
assertions of the third-party information merchant. If the information merchant
provides information that is not useful, the market for its information should
deteriorate, and eventually the information merchant should fail. Also, if the
information merchant has no connection with the borrower, there is no reason to
expect its information regarding the borrower to be biased.
A variety of problems traditionally have limited the ability of pure information merchants to proliferate in our economy. The first difficulty is a free-rider
problem. Information merchants often can do little to prevent their customers
from reselling information that they purchased from the information merchant.
If the marginal cost of reproducing the information for resale is quite low (as it
normally is), then each customer can resell at a profit (at a price just above that
cost). 162 Unless the information merchant can develop institutions to prohibit
such reselling by its customers, its prices will be driven down to the marginal
cost of copying, which is unlikely to provide a sufficient return to justify

continued collection and analysis of information. A related problem is Arrow's
well-known information paradox, which shows that it is difficult to sell information "because it is hard for a user to evaluate information without learning it, at
161. See supra note 146 (discussing that difficulty as a general problem with word-of-mouth
verification systems). That same limitation is evident in rotating credit clubs. See Hal Varian, Monitoring Agents with Other Agents, 146 J. INST. & THEoR. ECON. 153, 155-69 (1990) (providing a formal
analysis of that effect); Lykke Eg Anderson & Osvaldo Nina, Micro-Credit and Group Lending: The
Collateral Effect 2-3 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing a "peer screening
effect" under which "members [of such groups] choose to be in a group with others whom they believe
to be credit-worthy and whom they can rely on to make timely payments" and explaining that the effect
is useful "because community members have much better information about each other than the bank
has"). Those clubs are common in many American immigrant communities and in numerous lessdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa: the need to rely on community information to assess reliability
limits the clubs' membership to closely-knit ethnic groups. See Clifford Geertz, The Rotating Credit
Association: A "Middle Rung" in Development, 10 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 241 (1962)
(discussing rotating credit associations in Japan, southeast Asia, and Africa); Christine Gorman,
Do-It-Yourself Financing; Loan Clubs Offer Cash and Dreams, TIME, July 25, 1988, at 62 (discussing
rotating credit associations in American immigrant groups); Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and
Markets 43-67 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing rotating credit associations in America and elsewhere); see also Posner, supra note 4, at 168-71 (providing a general
economic analysis of rotating credit groups).
162. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 111, at 102-03.
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which point there is no need to pay for it." 163
To succeed in the face of those problems, information merchants must do two
things. First, they have to provide some credible verification of the information,
something ordinarily done with a reputational bond.' 64 Second, because of the
free-rider problem, information merchants traditionally have succeeded in situations in which information is unusually time-sensitive or repeat transactions are
rare, so that the potential benefits from free-riding are small. In those areas,
resale of the information would be impractical, either because nobody else
would have a use for the information, or because the information would have
lost most of its value by the time a purchaser could find someone else to whom
it could resell the information.
Consider the two contexts mentioned above: check verification and investment newsletters. In the first context, it would not be practicable for a merchant
to save the information it receives on a particular check and attempt to resell the
information to another merchant that considers accepting another check from
the same consumer on a later date. Among other things, the possibility that the
creditworthiness of the consumer would have changed during the intervening
time renders the old information stale. Thus, in that case free-riding is difficult
because the transactions in which the information would be useful occur at
different times, but each calls for current information.
Similarly, the value of stock tips and similar information in investment
newsletters probably degrades quite quickly upon the issuance of the newsletter.
Again, that could be true because of external changes in the market that render
the information out-of-date. Alternatively, even in the absence of such changes,
the information is likely to be disseminated and incorporated into market prices
quite quickly after its publication, rendering the information of little continuing
value. 65 Thus, the high efficiency of the securities markets in so rapidly dealing
166
with information makes it particularly difficult for free-riding to succeed.
In both of those cases, time sensitivity limits the ability of any individual
163. Id. at 103; see also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 765-66 (1997) (explaining Arrow's information paradox).
164. See Fox, supra note 111, at 103 (suggesting "an incentive for users to get their information
only from suppliers who have established their trustworthiness over a long period of continued
relationship").
165. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 565-92 (discussing the mechanisms by which
securities markets rapidly account for new information regarding the value of securities); see also Larry
Y. Dann et al., Trading Rules, Large Blocks and the Speed of Price Adjustment, 4 J. FIN. EcON. 3, 21
(1977) (summarizing study arguing that the market incorporates the price effect of large-block trades on
the New York Stock Exchange in about 15 minutes); Michael T. Maloney & Harold Mulherin, The
Stock Price Reaction to the Challenger Crash (Dec. 7, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (event study arguing that the market accounted for the crash of the Space Shuttle Challenger by
the end of the day on which the crash occurred).
166. Of course, the rosy picture painted in the text is only one possible explanation for such
newsletters. It also is possible that the customers of such newsletters are dupes and that the newsletters
contain no valuable information not already reflected in existing market prices. Indeed, it also is
possible that on some occasions the information in such newsletters reflects fraudulent attempts by
insiders to manipulate stock prices by disseminating false or misleading information.
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purchaser to resell the information to others that could have purchased directly
from the information merchant. Absent such a limitation, however, it is difficult
for information merchants to be profitable. Thus, there is little role in the
existing commercial marketplace for the information merchant. To be sure,
recent advances in information technology have increased the ability of information merchants to protect themselves against retransmittal of their information
and presage (in my view) a broad role for information merchants in financing
transactions. But those developments are only beginning to appear in the
67
marketplace, and thus remain beyond the scope of this article. 1
3. Information Intermediaries
The final device by which a third party verifies information involves an
intermediary. Like those of the information merchant, the assertions of the
information intermediary ordinarily are verified by the reputational sanctions
that constrain the information intermediary. The difference is that the intermediary does not sell the information as a third party. Instead, the intermediary
inserts itself into the transaction between the borrower and the lender, indicating
its trust of the borrower by its own willingness to invest in the borrower. 68
By placing itself in the transaction between the borrower to which the
information relates and the lenders that wish to take advantage of the information, the information intermediary can solve the free-rider problem that afflicts
information merchants. 169 Whatever the customers of the information intermediary do with the information, they will have to come to the information intermediary to use the information to invest in the borrower. On the other hand, because
the information intermediary gives itself an interest in the borrower, the information that the intermediary provides necessarily is subject to bias. Whether the
reputational constraint is sufficient to overcome the perception of bias is a
context-sensitive question. But it should be clear that the arrangement will work
170
only in areas where reputational constraints are powerful.
The most obvious example of this institution is the commonly described
phenomenon of reputational intermediation in the securities markets. As Ron
Gilson and Reinier Kraakman first explained, the investment bank appears to
serve a function beyond its nominal tasks of collecting and evaluating information about the borrower and marketing the borrower's securities to potential
lenders. Specifically, the investment bank "rents" its own reputation to the
borrower as a bond for the quality of the information associated with the
167. See Ronald J. Mann, Information Technology and Institutions for Verifying Information (Apr.
1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
168. For consistency of terminology, I use the terms "borrower" and "lender" throughout this
section even though the mechanisms in question typically involve equity investments in issuers by
investors, rather than loans to borrowers from lenders.
169. See Fox, supra note 11, at 102-03.
170. That assumes (as I believe) that any remedy the legal system might provide against the
information intermediary is either ineffective or counterproductive. See supra Part 11A4 and note 142.
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issue. 17 1 Similarly, stock exchanges at one point in time seem to have provided
verifying the quality of companies by agreeing to list their
a similar service,
72
1
securities.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which current lenders rely on the
reputation of the intermediary, 1 73 but the limited empirical evidence suggests
that the effect is significant in at least some contexts.' 74 In any event, the
elegant structure of the institution is easy to see. The reputation of the intermediary (third-order information) verifies the assertion of the intermediary
(second-order information), which in turn verifies the assertions of the borrower
(first-order information). Here, as with the word-of-mouth transactions described above, the intermediary is useful because of the superior value of its
reputational bond. The information intermediary tends to be large, well known,
and a frequent participant in the financial markets.' 75 The borrower in those
transactions, by contrast, is often a smaller or newer company that has not built
a financial structure dependent on constant access to the financial markets. As a

171. The classic explication appears in Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 618-21. A brief
suggestion of the effect appeared several years earlier in Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, FinancialStructure, and FinancialIntermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371, 383-84 (1977).
Gilson and Bernie Black extend that analysis to the venture-capital context in Black & Gilson, supra
note 97, at 254-55.
172. See Jonathan R. Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of
Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1007, 1023-24
(1990). Macey and Kanda argue that other reputational intermediaries have displaced the role of the
New York Stock Exchange as a reputational intermediary. See id. at 1040-42. They do believe,
however, that reputational intermediation remains an important function of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
See id. at 1048-49.
173. Saul Levmore, for example, finds Gilson and Kraakman's explanation completely unpersuasive. See Saul Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. REv. 645, 657-59
(1984).
174. See, e.g., Richard B. Carter & Frederick H. Dark, An Empirical Examination of Investment
Banking Reputation Measures, 27 FIN. REv. 355, 360-71 (1992) (reporting statistically significant
inverse relation between reputation of the underwriter [as measured by placement in "tombstone"
advertisements] and both initial underpricing of the issue [as measured by first-day return] and risk of
the issue [as measured by variance over the first 20 days after issuance]); Richard B. Carter & Steven
Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 1059-62 (1990)
(reporting evidence of a statistically significant inverse relation between reputation of the underwriter
[as measured by placement in "tombstone" advertisements] and initial underpricing of the issue [as
measured by two-week market-adjusted return]); Gompers & Lemer, supra note 22, at 30 (reporting
statistical evidence of a positive relation between the performance of the initial public offerings of
venture-capital supported firms and the relative reputation of the underwriters of the offerings);
Kenneth A. Carow, Underwriting Spreads and Reputational Capital: An Analysis of New Corporate
Securities (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (reporting a statistically significant
relation between barriers to entry into new product lines, as measured by spreads on products issued in
new lines, and the general reputation of the underwriter).
175. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 620 (explaining how "repeat player" status of
investment bankers limits "final period" problems that "dampen" the value of investments in reputation); see also Leland & Pyle, supra note 171, at 383-84 (explaining that an informational intermediary
can succeed only if it has a mechanism for convincing investors to rely on the information that it
gathers). For a discussion of potential problems in relying on the reputational bonds of underwriters and
similarly situated parties, see Choi, supra note 4, at 924-27.
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result, the reputational bond of the borrower is less valuable. 17 6
CONCLUSION

This article is but a first step in a new direction. With that in mind, I hope the
article has done two things. The first is to provide a broad framework for
understanding the devices that commercial enterprises use to resolve information problems that confront them. By describing the deep structure that those
institutions share, I hope that I have illuminated the many similarities that tie
together seemingly disparate arrangements.
That effort-grounded in the details of particular contexts-leads directly to
the second goal. At the contextual level, I hope to have provided enough detail
about a few particular verification institutions to further our understanding of
how the institutions actually work to lower transaction costs and thus facilitate
contracting. Also, by underscoring the extent to which parties rely on multiple
overlapping devices at the same time-often combining reputation with some
publicly supported remedy-the article should show how truly similar in function the public and privately ordered remedies really are. That contextual
understanding should be the most valuable contribution of the work, because an
understanding of the mechanics of those institutions is a necessary premise for
any thoughtful evaluation of the policy implications of any of those institutions.
Among other things, it should be more difficult to justify condemnation of the
conduct if it appears to be a normal and comprehensible response to an
77
informational problem instead of an inexplicable exercise of leverage. 1
To call this article a first step is to suggest other steps. The work readily calls
for extension in two directions. The first is to take it forward in time. The
institutions discussed in this article are by definition institutions for resolving
problems about information. But any institution related to information will be
powerfully affected by the rapid changes in information technology that fundamentally alter our ability to obtain, analyze, and disseminate information. No
discussion of those institutions can be complete without an assessment of how
the developments of sophisticated information technology will alter the institutions.
Although this is not the place for a complete analysis, 178 it seems likely that
advances in information technology will alter those institutions profoundly.

176. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 619-20 (discussing problems with the reputational
bonds of smaller securities issuers); Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Small-Firm Information Problem: Private
Information and Public Policy, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 177, 180-82 (1998) (discussing the
information problems that afflict small businesses); discussion supra Part Iic2 (discussing conditions in
which reputational sanctioning is effective and ineffective).
177. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 51, at 1510-15 (arguing that principles of behavioral economics
justify banning transactions that occur "at terms far from the terms on which those transactions
generally occur in the marketplace") (emphasis omitted).
178. This paragraph summarizes a forthcoming paper that analyzes the topic in detail. For further
explication, see Mann, supra note 167.
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Four effects are salient. First, and most directly, by lowering the costs of
evaluating information, those advances will make direct verification of information more practical and thus in some contexts remove any need for the indirect
verification institutions discussed in this article. Second, the advances should
enhance the effectiveness of reputational sanctions by lowering the costs creditors incur in ascertaining and assessing reputation. Third, by lowering the costs
of processing information, they already have broadened substantially the fields
within which reputational intermediation can be effective: a technique that once
was limited to the most creditworthy blue-chip stocks has been extended
through the process of securitization to home mortgages, credit-card receivables, and other obligations of similarly dubious reliability. Finally, advances in
software technology should solve the free-rider problems that hitherto have
limited the role of information merchants.
The second step for extension involves the general relation between commercial law and commercial practice. One of the most intractable problems in
commercial law is the interaction between the privately formulated norms and
practices of commercial parties and the publicly formulated rules that the law
provides for those parties' transactions.1 79 As a number of scholars have recognized, it is too simplistic to treat the codification of commercial law as a
codification of the norms reflected in everyday business practices. 80
This work suggests the potential for a similar dissonance between legal rules
and nonlegal sanctions. The mechanisms discussed here necessarily involve the
harsh exercise of power in commercial transactions. Concerns about the exercise of that power are underscored by the likelihood that the power often will be
exercised by a larger and more experienced entity (the typical commercial
lender) against a smaller and less experienced entity (the typical party seeking
funds). The natural impulse of the law would be to respond to that harshness by
limiting the potential for the exercise of that power. 181
But that response would be too easy. Legal rules cannot eradicate the
mechanisms that I have described any more than they could eradicate the
institution of secured credit. As several of the examples in this article suggest,
efforts to prohibit the use of the most effective institutions inevitably lead
businesses to use less effective institutions-which are more costly but sufficiently invisible to the legal system to be beyond the reach of the prohibitions
available to policymakers. Thus, policymakers who want to affect the tenor of
commercial life must work to develop rules that account for the legitimate
needs reflected in the reality of commercial transactions. As always, I hope that
my work provides a glimpse of that reality.
179. For two of the most interesting treatments of that topic, see Bernstein, supra note 4; Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the InteractionsBetween
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261 (1985).
180. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 4, at 1820-21.
181. See, e.g., MacNeil, supra note 40, at 1056-62 (arguing that American law includes a general
preference against permitting the exercise of power in contracting relations).

